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O’BANNON V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION: A CINDERELLA STORY
“I don’t remember the last time 70,000 people packed into the
Orange Bowl to watch a chemistry experiment.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) gen-
erated annual revenue of over $912 million dollars in 2013,
a nearly five-percent year-over-year growth.2  NCAA student-
athletes, who are the main attraction at the sporting events that
generate much of the NCAA’s revenue through television contracts,
ticket sales, and merchandise sales,3 do not receive any of this
1. See Jim Like, It’s Time the Players Shared in the Bounty, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan.
5, 1995, 7:19PM), available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1995/It-s-Time-The-
Players-Shared-In-The-Bounty/id-b38bc45c378523d34ee9f8509aa0bc08 (quoting
former University of Miami football player, Randy Bethel, discussing profit of col-
lege football programs and coaches, and arguing that players should get share of
profits). Former Miami tight end Randy Bethel argued that the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA), schools, and athletic programs want the players to be
like regular students, but noted, “regular students don’t generate revenue like we
do.” See id.  Additionally, the article referred to Miami safety, Charles Pharms, who
said that he “can’t even afford to buy a $40 Hurricanes sweatshirt.” See id.  He
argued that to “expect athletes to stand by while everyone else around them cashes
in” is “increasingly unrealistic.” See id. See also Alexander Wolff, An Honest Wage,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 30, 1994, at 98 (quoting Bethel regarding accepting
money for play).
2. Letter from Deloitte & Touche LLP, Independent Auditor, to Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n and Subsidiaries (NCAA), Consolidated Financial Statements
as of and for the Years Ended August 31, 2013 and 2012, Supplementary Informa-
tion as of and for the Year Ended August 31, 2013, and Independent Auditors’
Report 4 (Dec. 4, 2013) [hereinafter “NCAA Consolidated Statements 2012-
2013”], available at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCAA_FS_2012-
13_V1%20DOC1006715.pdf (reporting consolidated financial statement of activi-
ties, revenue, and revenue growth rate for years ended August 31, 2013, and Au-
gust 31, 2012 based on independent audit conducted by Deloitte & Touche LLP).
3. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW, 20-21 (4th ed. 2010) (dis-
cussing major sources of revenue for NCAA).  Wong notes that most of the reve-
nue comes from a few sports and sporting events, particularly the Division I Men’s
Basketball Championship Tournament. See id. at 19.  Wong states that “football is
one of the largest revenue generators for its member schools,” but the NCAA does
not benefit financially as an entity from the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision
(“FBS”), because there is no tournament. See id. at 21.  However, the 2014-2015
FBS season marked the first season with a FBS “College Football Playoff.” See An-
swers About Football’s New Playoff, NCAA (Sept. 17, 2014), available at http://www
.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2012-06-30/answers-about-footballs-new-playoff
(giving more information on College Football Playoff).  The Playoff, expected to
be worth “at least double what the [Bowl Championship Series] was worth,” will
likely generate “$300 million easy, probably more like $400 or $500.” See id.
(179)
1
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revenue.4
The NCAA dedicates an entire section of its Bylaws to amateur-
ism.5  The NCAA requires that only amateur student-athletes par-
ticipate in NCAA athletics, and strives to maintain a “clear line of
demarcation” between college and professional athletics.6  Should a
student-athlete violate the NCAA’s amateurism principle, that ath-
lete will lose eligibility.7
In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, current
and former Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”) players
and Division I basketball players, led by former University of Cali-
fornia Los Angeles (“UCLA”) national basketball champion Ed
O’Bannon,8 alleged that the NCAA violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act by fixing the price of the student-athletes’ names, images, and
likenesses (“NIL”) and, thus, that the NCAA illegally restrained
competition in the marketplace.9  The outcome of the case impacts
the NCAA, its member schools, college sports fans, and most impor-
tantly Division I basketball and FBS football players.10
4. See NCAA DIV. I OPERATING BYLAWS, art. 12.02.8, in 2014-2015 DIV. 1 MAN-
UAL (2014), available at https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4355-2014-2015-
ncaa-division-i-manual-august-version.aspx [hereinafter “OPERATING BYLAWS”] (de-
fining pay and noting a student-athlete cannot accept pay if he or she participates
in NCAA athletics). See also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp.
3d 955, 971-73 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (discussing NCAA rules restricting student-athlete
compensation).
5. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4,  art. 12 (defining amateurism and eli- R
gibility requirements of NCAA members).
6. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, arts. 1.3.1, 2.9, in 2014-2015 DIV. 1 MANUAL
(2014), available at https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4355-2014-2015-ncaa-divi-
sion-i-manual-august-version.aspx (noting basic purpose of NCAA and defining
NCAA’s amateurism principle); OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.01.2 (de- R
fining “clear line of demarcation” that student-athletes must maintain to remain
eligible for NCAA member schools).  For a further look at the NCAA’s amateurism
principle, see infra note 51 and accompanying text. But see O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d R
at 973-78 (discussing inconsistencies in NCAA’s definition of amateurism from
NCAA’s inception in 1906 until today).  In O’Bannon, the court noted that the
NCAA’s initial rules in 1906 would have prohibited the types of athletic scholar-
ships that schools offer recruits today. See id. at 974.  The O’Bannon court discussed
other changes to the NCAA’s amateurism policy and determined that the NCAA
cannot be so dedicated to a specific, blanket definition of amateurism if it has
changed the nuances of the bylaws multiple times. See generally id. at 975 (discuss-
ing obvious and substantial differences in definition throughout NCAA history).
7. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.1.2 (listing violations from R
which student-athlete will lose amateur status and intercollegiate athletic
eligibility).
8. See Alan Shipnuck, Closing the Deal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 8, 2014, at 53
(describing former UCLA power forward Ed O’Bannon).
9. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 962-63 (providing overview of plaintiffs’
claims against NCAA).
10. For a further discussion of the impact of O’Bannon, see infra notes 222-262 R
and accompanying text.
2
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This Note discusses and analyzes the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California’s ruling in O’Bannon v.
NCAA and asserts that the court’s decision will have a substantial,
long-term impact on the future of NCAA athletics.11  Part II in-
troduces the background of O’Bannon v. NCAA.12  Part III outlines
relevant background information including, a deeper look at the
NCAA’s Bylaws, NCAA student-athletes’ time commitments, and
past NCAA violations.13  Part IV discusses antitrust law.14  Part V
provides a narrative analysis of the O’Bannon decision, and Part VI
critically analyzes that decision.15  Finally, Part VII concludes by dis-
cussing the impact O’Bannon will have on the future of collegiate
athletics.16
II. FACTS
In 2009, Ed O’Bannon and Craig Newsome, a former Arizona
State University football player, filed suits against the NCAA and the
Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”) alleging that the NCAA
and CLC were “engaging in anti-competitive conduct in violation of
the Sherman Act.”17  The court certified the class action, following
11. For a further discussion of the court’s opinion in O’Bannon, see infra notes
122-220 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of the impact, see infra R
notes 235-262, and the text accompanying each note. R
12. For a further discussion of O’Bannon, see infra notes 17-33 and the text R
accompanying the notes.
13. For a further discussion of the relevant NCAA Bylaws, student-athletes’
time commitments, and past NCAA violations, see infra notes 35-89 and the text R
accompanying the notes.
14. For a further discussion of the antitrust law, see infra notes 90-121 and R
their accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the court’s opinion in O’Bannon, see infra notes
221-234 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis, see infra notes 221-234 and
the accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the impact of O’Bannon, see infra notes 235-262 R
and accompanying text.
17. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 962-65 (providing background information
on lawsuit).  The court consolidated Newsome’s and O’Bannon’s actions along
with another complaint which alleged that Electronic Arts (“EA”), a video game
developing and production company, designed the football players in the video
game “NCAA Football” to resemble real college athletes. See Keller v. Electronics
Arts, Inc., C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) aff’d sub
nom. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268
(9th Cir. 2013) (discussing similarities between videogame characters and “real-life
college football athletes”).  Keller claimed, “that these virtual players are nearly
identical to their real-life counterparts: they share the same jersey numbers, have
similar physical characteristics and come from the same home state.” See id.  Keller
charged the NCAA, CLC, and EA with variations of improper use of his image and
likeness. See id. at *2 (discussing Keller’s claims). See also Ben Bolas, EA Sports: If
It’s In the Game, It’s In the Courtroom, MOORAD SPORTS L. J. BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://lawweb2009.law.villanova.edu/sportslaw/?p=2312 (discussing implications
3
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the plaintiffs’ amendment to include current NCAA athletes.18  The
former athletes believed that once an athlete leaves a university, the
amateur tag disappears; therefore, former NCAA athletes should re-
ceive compensation for use of their NIL.19  However, by including
current NCAA players in the suit, the issue shifted to compensating
of lawsuit against EA and NCAA’s decision not to renew contract with EA). But see
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 965 (describing EA and CLC defendants and noting
that plaintiffs settled claims with both defendants); Press Release, NCAA, NCAA
Reaches Settlement in EA Video Game Lawsuit (June 9, 2014) (on file with au-
thor) (discussing $20 million dollar settlement to end Keller litigation and com-
pensate plaintiffs).
18. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 965 (explaining plaintiffs in class action).
The court cited to the class action certification on April 11, 2014:
All current and former student-athletes residing in the United States who
compete on, or competed on, an NCAA Division I (formerly known as
“University Division” before 1973) college or university men’s basketball
team or on an NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (formerly known as Divi-
sion I–A until 2006) men’s football team and whose images, likenesses
and/or names may be, or have been, included or could have been in-
cluded (by virtue of their appearance in a team roster) in game footage
or in videogames licensed or sold by Defendants, their co-conspirators, or
their licensees.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Chuck Haven, Will the O’Bannon Lawsuit Change Fi-
nally Change the NCAA?, MOORAD SPORTS L. J. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012), http://law-
web2009.law.villanova.edu/sportslaw/?p=1059 (“According to the suit the NCAA
deprives current and former athletes of publicity rights and compensation while
exploiting a $4 billion market with their licensing arm[.]”).  U.S. District Judge
Wilken partially granted the class action status of the lawsuit, but denied plaintiffs’
bid for a class that could seek monetary damages against the NCAA because of the
difficulty in determining who was actually harmed. See Steve Berkowitz, Judge Al-
lows Challenge of NCAA Amateurism Rules, USA TODAY SPORTS (Nov. 9, 2013), http:/
/www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/11/08/ncaa-class-action-lawsuit-
obannon-amateurism/3479501/ (discussing Judge Wilken’s ruling).
19. See Haven, supra note 18 (“The plaintiffs believe that it follows logically R
that once the player leaves, he or she no longer has an amateur status to protect,
and should be rightfully compensated from that day forward.”). See also Shipnuck,
supra note 8, at 55 (describing Ed O’Bannon’s reaction to NCAA’s perpetual use of R
rights to his identity when he saw himself on EA’s video game).  In Shipnuck’s
article, O’Bannon recounts how he saw his friend’s son playing EA Sports’ NCAA
Basketball ‘09 with the 1995 Bruins and noticed the similarity between himself and
the player in the video game wearing his old number. See Shipnuck, supra note 8, R
at 55.  O’Bannon’s initial excitement subsided when a friend raised the following
point: “You know what’s crazy, Ed? They spent 60 bucks on this game but you’re
not getting a penny.” See  Shipnuck, supra note 8, at 55. His friend’s comments R
brought back his “old frustrations” with the NCAA and angered him that although
it had been years since he left UCLA the NCAA was “still exploiting” him. See
Shipnuck, supra note 8, at 55. Shipnuck quotes O’Bannon as stating the following: R
“If somebody took your face and made you the star of a video game, you’d expect
to get compensated, right? In no other walk of life can your identity be stolen like
that.” See Shipnuck, supra note 8, at 55. R
4
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student-athletes.20  Compensating student-athletes would be a gross
deviation from the NCAA’s principles.21
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA unlawfully re-
strained trade in the marketplace by fixing the price that NCAA
Division I basketball and FBS football schools could offer recruits.22
Also, the O’Bannon plaintiffs sought other revenue generated
through the use of their NIL, such as in television licensing con-
tracts and archival footage played on commercials, advertisements,
and re-broadcasts.23  Plaintiffs attempted to prove that the NCAA
conspired to unreasonably restrain trade in the relevant markets.24
Under the burden-shifting rule of reason analysis,25 the student-ath-
20. See Haven, supra note 18 (discussing change in relief expected with addi- R
tion of current NCAA athletes).
21. See generally OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12 (outlining NCAA am- R
ateurism and athletics eligibility).
22. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 962, 971-73 (providing general
and in depth look at plaintiffs’ claims against NCAA, specifically “undervaluing”
price of student-athletes’ NIL). See also Haven, supra note 18 (discussing back- R
ground of O’Bannon case); Robert Wheel, Ed O’Bannon vs. the NCAA: The Antitrust
Lawsuit Explained, SB NATION (Jan 31, 2013), http://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2013/1/31/3934886/ncaa-lawsuit-ed-obannon (explaining O’Bannon v.
NCAA).
23. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 963, 968-73 (providing overview of plain-
tiffs’ claims, as well as detail into video games market and challenged restraint).
See also Bolas, supra note 17 (“While other college-athletes have also sued EA re- R
cently, the O’Bannon case seems to have the broadest implications because the
O’Bannon plaintiffs seek to include other revenue generated from college athlet-
ics (such as television and memorabilia revenue) under the purview of their com-
plaint.”).  The NCAA requires student-athletes to sign “Form 08-3a” as part of the
“Student-Athlete Statement” as required by the NCAA Constitution before partici-
pating in athletics, which gives the NCAA the right to use and license out student-
athletes’ NIL.  See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, art. 3.2.4.6 (prescribing rule R
for administration of form that student-athletes must sign). See also Gregory
Sconzo, They’re Not Yours, They Are My Own: How NCAA Employment Restrictions Violate
Antitrust Law, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 746 (2013) (discussing Form 08-3a).  One
part of the form requires student-athletes to authorize the NCAA or a third party
acting on behalf of the NCAA to use their NIL. See id.  The NCAA can profit off of
student-athletes’ NIL, but the students themselves have no right to such profits.
See id. There are limitations on the use of student-athletes’ NIL, however, there is
no time limit on the right to use the NIL. See Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspeci-
fied Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-Trust Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 21, 2009),
http://www.si.com/more-sports/2009/07/21/ncaa (explaining antitrust re-
straint).  McCann argues that when the NCAA requires a student-athlete to forego
his or her own rights to his or her own image and likeness, the NCAA restrains
trade, because if those student-athletes had not foregone their rights, “they would
be able to negotiate their own licensing deals after leaving college.” See id.
24. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962-93, 984-85 (stating and applying plain-
tiffs’ contentions to Sherman Antitrust Act).  For a further discussion of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act analysis, see sources cited infra notes 93-106 and accompanying R
text.
25. See id. at 985 (noting that Rule of Reason analysis is standard and explain-
ing analysis). “The Supreme Court has specifically held that concerted actions un-
5
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letes argued that the NCAA’s rules had anticompetitive effects in
the relevant markets.26  The NCAA attempted to rebut those argu-
ments with four procompetitive effects of the restrictions.27  The
court accepted two procompetitive effects, and the student-athletes
countered by arguing that the NCAA could achieve those in a less
restrictive manner.28
The plaintiffs’ main goal was change.29  On August 8, 2014,
District Judge Claudia Wilken ruled, in an unprecedented opinion,
that Division I basketball and FBS schools may pay student-athletes
a share of the revenue made from licensing student-athletes’ NIL.30
Judge Wilken enjoined the NCAA from prohibiting student-athlete
compensation.31  However, Judge Wilken determined that the
NCAA did not have to pay student-athletes, and the NCAA could
also cap the amount at five thousand dollars.32  Although the NCAA
is appealing Judge Wilken’s ruling out of the Northern District of
dertaken by joint ventures should be analyzed under the rule of reason.” See id.
(citing American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010).
See also id. (“Courts typically rely on a burden-shifting framework to conduct this
balancing.”).  For a further discussion of standard antitrust analysis in the sporting
context, see infra notes 102-109 and accompanying text. R
26. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985 (elaborating on plaintiff’s burden in
case against NCAA related to Sherman Antitrust Act).
27. See id. (citations omitted) (citing Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059,
1063 (9th Cir. 2001)) (explaining rule of reason balancing test further).
28. See id. (citations omitted)  (citing Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063) (explaining
plaintiff’s job if defendants meet initial burden of showing procompetitive effects).
29. See Greg Bishop, Lawsuit Name for O’Bannon Has Other Critical Participants,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/sports/lawsuit-
named-for-obannon-has-other-critical-participants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&
(noting members of lawsuit and their reasons for joining).  Bishop quotes
O’Bannon as stating the following: “I want systemic change.  That’s what we’re
here for.” See id. Bishop also discusses other notable members of the lawsuit,
Harry Flournoy and Sam Keller, who also wanted to see change happen. See id.
Flournoy, the former captain of Texas Western College’s basketball team—the first
all-black starting lineup to win a NCAA Championship—simply wanted fairness.
See id. Additionally, Sam Keller adamantly noted that NCAA athletes are “not ama-
teurs” and have never been. See id.  See also Shipnuck, supra note 8, at 55 R
(“O’Bannon says the lawsuit is not about changing the game but rather about lev-
eling the playing field financially.”).
30. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-09 (emphasis added) (concluding and
discussing plaintiffs’ remedy).
31. See id. at 1007-08 (“[T]he Court will enjoin the NCAA from enforcing any
rules or bylaws that would prohibit its member schools and conferences from offer-
ing their FBS football or Division I basketball recruits a limited share of the reve-
nues generated from the use of their [NIL] in addition to full grant-in-aid.”).
32. See id. at 1008 (emphasis added) (noting Judge Wilken’s conclusion in
case).  Judge Wilken noted that the NCAA may still “implement[ ] rules capping
the amount of compensation that may be paid to student-athletes while they are
enrolled in school” and that “the injunction will permit the NCAA to set a cap on
the amount of money that may be held in trust.” See id. However, the NCAA “will
not be permitted to set this cap below the cost of attendance,” nor will the NCAA
6
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California, the decision has an immediate and long-term impact on
the NCAA, particularly on FBS and Division I schools.33
III. BACKGROUND
“[A] lot of the classes conflict with your time as a football
player. You have an engineering class from 2 to 3:30, there’s
no way you can do both. You can’t go to meetings and take
your engineering class from 2 to 3:30, so what do you do?
What do you do? Do you switch your major or do you tell your
coach, ‘Hey, I’ve got an engineering class from 2 to 3:30
and I have to go to that.’”34
A. Students First
The NCAA dedicates itself to protecting student-athletes and
preparing them with skills necessary to succeed in sports, academ-
ics, and life after college.35  The NCAA believes that student-ath-
letes should be committed to success and balance in the classroom
and on the field.36  One of the NCAA’s core values states student-
athletes “shall participate as an avocation, balancing their aca-
demic, social and athletic experience.”37
be permitted to “set[ ] a cap of less than five thousand dollars . . .  for every year
that the student-athlete remains academically eligible to compete.” See id.
33. For a further discussion of the implications of O’Bannon v. NCAA, see infra
notes 222-262 and accompanying text. R
34. Peter Volk, Richard Sherman on NCAA: ‘You’re Not on Scholarship for School’,
SB NATION (Jan, 30, 2015), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2015/1/
30/7951529/seahawks-richard-sherman-michael-bennett-slam-ncaa (quoting Seat-
tle Seahawk cornerback Richard Sherman from Super Bowl XLIV Media Day).  For
a further discussion of student-athletes’ time commitments, see infra notes 45-47 R
and accompanying text.
35. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, arts. 1.2(a), 1.3.1 (explaining pur- R
pose of NCAA “to promote and develop educational leadership, physical fitness,
athletics excellence and athletics participation . . . “ and to maintain student-ath-
letes as integral part of student body).
36. See id. (inferring that to maintain student-athletes as integral part of stu-
dent body, they must balance school and sport life).  Further, the NCAA relied on
‘integration’ as a procompetitive effect of the NCAA’s compensation restrictions in
O’Bannon. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 979-981 (discussing NCAA’s proposed
justification for compensation restrictions).
37. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, art. 2.9 (stating NCAA’s principle R
on amateurism). See also Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of
Redefining Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 559 (2009) (describing ideal of amateur-
ism).  As Fitt points out, the NCAA’s amateurism principle is ironic in its own lan-
guage. See id.  She notes that the student participation in the NCAA is called an
“avocation,” which has two meanings: “[a]n activity taken up in addition to one’s
regular work or profession, usually for enjoyment” and “[o]ne’s regular work or
profession.” See id.
7
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Student-athletes are meant to be students first and athletes sec-
ond, however, they arguably spend all of their time outside the
classroom training for their respective sports.38  Further, student-
athletes attract money to their schools through athletics, not neces-
sarily academics.39  The term “student-athlete” implies that the
sport is an extra-curricular activity.40  However, for student-athletes,
the extra-curricular activity is likely their schoolwork.41
A 2011 NCAA “GOALS” Study calculated responses of 19,967
Division I, II, and III student-athletes regarding their athletic, aca-
demic, and social experiences; their decisions to attend their cur-
rent college; and their time commitments.42  Over 600 Divisions I,
II, and III schools participated in the survey.43  For the purposes of
this Note, analysis of the study results will focus on those groups
relevant in O’Bannon: Division I men’s basketball players and FBS
players.44
According to the survey, in 2010, Division I basketball players
spent over thirty-nine hours per week in-season on athletic activities
38. For a further discussion of student-athletes’ time commitments, see
sources cited infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. R
39. See NCAA Consolidated Statements 2012-2013, supra note 2 (showing R
NCAA revenues); WONG, supra note 3, at 20-21 (discussing NCAA’s revenues). R
Wong created a table noting the NCAA’s total revenues per year from 2004-2010.
See id. Exhibit 1.6, at 21 (organizing annual revenue by total revenue and television
revenue).  Wong explains that the NCAA’s television contracts provide the NCAA’s
main source of income. See id. See also Katherine Tohanczyn, Note, Fumble! How the
North Carolina Courts Dropped the Ball in McAdoo v. University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, 21 MOORAD SPORTS L. J. 385, 385 (2014) (stating that college athletics
is multibillion-dollar business); Michael Corgan, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept
Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by
Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 371, 388-94 (2012) (elaborating on NCAA commercialization).
40. See Gary Gutting, The Myth of the ‘Student-Athlete’, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
BLOG, (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:30PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/
15/the-myth-of-the-student-athlete/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=
blogs&_r= (“The term ‘student-athletes’ implies that all enrolled students who play
college sports are engaged in secondary (‘extra-curricular’) activities . . . .”). See
also sources cited supra note 37 and accompanying text. R
41. For a further discussion of the amount of time student-athletes report
spending on schoolwork compared to athletics, see infra notes 45-47 and accompa- R
nying text.
42. See generally NCAA CONVENTION, Examining the Student-Athlete Experience
Through the NCAA GOALS and SCORE Studies, NCAA 2-5 (Jan. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/•Examining%20the%20Student-Athlete
%20Experience%20Through%20the%20NCAA%20GOALS%20and%20SCORE%
20Studies.pdf [hereinafter “GOALS Study”] (explaining GOALS Study’s purpose
and expanding on its response).
43. See GOALS Study, supra note 42, at 4 (discussing how many schools partic- R
ipated in survey).
44. For a further discussion of who O’Bannon affects, see supra note 18, infra R
note 122, and each note’s accompanying text. R
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and FBS players spent over forty-three hours per week.45  Division I
basketball players reported just above thirty-seven hours on aca-
demic work compared to the thirty-nine spent on athletic activi-
ties.46  FBS football players reported thirty-eight hours spent on
academics versus forty-three hours spent on athletics.47
The survey also included a “Student-Athlete Identity” test, in
which the NCAA student-athletes were asked on a scale of one to
six—six indicating strongly agree and one indicating strongly disa-
gree—whether they identify with the statements asked.48  Student-
athletes responded that they identify themselves more as dedicated
athletes than dedicated students.49  Strikingly, however, only about
1% of student-athletes in the most popular and highest grossing
NCAA sports, men’s basketball and football, will become profes-
sional athletes.50  This disparity begs for change in the way that
NCAA schools compensate their student-athletes.
B. NCAA Rules
The NCAA’s amateurism principle states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate
sport, and their participation should be motivated prima-
45. See GOALS Study, supra note 42, at 17 (listing survey responses regarding R
time spent on athletic activities). For comparative purposes, Division I football
players in the Football Championship Series, or “FCS,” spent over 41 hours on
athletics. See id.  The basketball players showed more than a two-hour increase in
the amount of time they spent on athletic activities since the previous study in
2006.  See id. (explaining color of boxes on chart signifies either decrease or in-
crease of time spent on athletic activities since 2006 study).  Only Division III ath-
letes, who are not offered athletic scholarships, spent more time on academic
activities versus athletic activities. See id. at 18.  Division I men’s basketball and
football show a negative difference in time spent on academics versus athletics
during the season. See id.
46. See GOALS Study, supra note 42, at 17-18 (listing Division I men’s basket- R
ball survey averages).
47. See GOALS Study, supra note 42, at 17-18 (listing FBS Football survey R
averages).
48. See GOALS Study, supra note 42, at 30-31 (explaining “Student-Athlete R
Identity” test measures and listing survey response results).
49. See GOALS Study, supra note 42, at 31 (listing “Student-Athlete Identity” R
test findings).  When asked if the NCAA participant considered himself or herself
a dedicated athlete, the mean response was 5.40. See id. In contrast, when asked
whether the NCAA participant considered himself or herself a dedicated student,
the mean response was 4.98. See id.
50. See Probability of Competing Beyond High School, NCAA (Sept. 2013), available
at http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-be-
yond-high-school (charting probability of competing beyond high school in men’s
and women’s basketball, football, baseball, men’s hockey, and men’s soccer).  Ap-
proximately 1.2% of men’s basketball players and 1.6% of NCAA football players
will become professional athletes. See id.
9
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rily by education and by the physical, mental and social
benefits to be derived.  Student participation in intercolle-
giate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should
be protected from exploitation by professional and com-
mercial enterprises.51
Through the enactment of these amateurism provisions, the
NCAA wishes to ensure that a student-athlete is a student first.52
Thus, the NCAA restricts student-athlete compensation for the use
of their own NIL.53  However, there seems to be an inequality in
Division I college sports because NCAA Division I athletics is a lu-
crative business for schools.54  The Division I men’s basketball and
FBS athletes, who raise money for and gain exposure to their
schools with wins and television contracts, receive little compared
to the time and effort they put into their respective programs.55
College athletics draw “publicity in a way few schools could dupli-
cate with a more traditional marketing campaign.”56
51. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 2.9 (noting amateurism R
principle).
52. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.01.2. (“The student-athlete is R
considered an integral part of the student body, thus maintaining a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.”).
53. See generally OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.1.2 (noting require- R
ments for student-athletes to maintain amateur status and prohibiting student-ath-
letes from accepting compensation for their athletic skill). See also Corgan, supra
note 39, at 376-78 (discussing NCAA Bylaws and restrictions on student-athlete R
compensation); Marc Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College
Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 862 (2002) (noting how NCAA’s amateur-
ism principle restricts student-athletes from making money off of their NIL, but
allows colleges and universities to make money off of student-athletes’ NIL).
54. For a further discussion of the NCAA’s big business, see supra note 39 and R
accompanying text.
55. See KRISTI DOSH, SATURDAY MILLIONAIRES: HOW WINNING FOOTBALL BUILDS
WINNING COLLEGES, 3-4 (2013) (discussing important role college athletics plays in
bringing attention to schools).  Dosh makes the following inquiry about how ath-
letics play a major role in schools’ marketing: “When I say Boise State University,
what’s the first thing you think of? Unless you’re part of the small minority who
attended school there, I’m guessing it’s the blue football field. Or perhaps the
Statue of Liberty play the Broncos used to win the 2007 Fiesta Bowl.” See id. at 3.
She continues: “As sure as I am that it wasn’t their 13th-ranked public undergradu-
ate engineering program that caught your eye, I’m positive it was something foot-
ball-related.” See id.
56. See Dosh, supra note 55, at 4 (discussing million dollar impact that college R
football has on schools).  “Let’s say you’re University of Alabama.  Are you going to
receive more applicants from a billboard . . . or from knocking [Louisiana State
University] out of national championship contention . . . ?” See id.  A study showed
that exposure to a university from ESPN’s College Gameday had a “$5 million
publicity impact.” See id.  For a further discussion of the money raised by football
programs, see infra note 73 and accompanying text. R
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The NCAA awards student-athletes with scholarships to cover
tuition, but which only cover the cost of attendance.57  The “cost of
attendance” includes the “total cost of tuition and fees, room and
board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses re-
lated to attendance at the institution.”58  A NCAA member institu-
tion must not award a student-athlete financial aid beyond the cost
of attendance that the institution usually charges students in com-
parable programs at the institution.59  Because of these provisions,
student-athletes must pay for the “incidental” costs of attending a
university.60  The NCAA argues that the student-athletes receive a
free education in exchange for the use of their NIL in connection
with football or basketball.61  But full tuition is not enough in rela-
tion to the amount of time student-athletes can actually spend on
their schoolwork.62
Further, the amateurism principle prohibits student-athletes
from receiving compensation, or any type of “improper benefits”
while playing in the NCAA.63  For example, a student-athlete will
lose his amateur status if he uses his athletic skills for any type of
pay.64  A student-athlete cannot enter into an agreement with an
agent, commit to play any kind of professional athletics, or compete
on a professional team, even if he receives no payment.65 A student-
athlete cannot receive any type of compensation, benefits, or pref-
57. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 15.1 (noting maximum limit on R
financial aid allowed to individual student is capped at “cost-of-attendance as de-
fined in Bylaw 15.02.2”).  For a further explanation on the “cost-of-attendance,”
see infra note 58 and accompanying text. R
58. OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 15.02.2 (defining “cost of attend- R
ance” at NCAA Div. I school).  The Bylaws detail how to calculate the cost of at-
tendance. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 15.02.2.1. R
59. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 15.01.6 (defining maximum R
amount of financial aid student-athletes may receive).  There are limitations on
the financial aid that NCAA institutions can provide to student-athletes. See gener-
ally OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4 at art. 15.2. R
60. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 988 (discussing fees student-athletes must
pay beyond scholarship money).
61. See generally OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 15 (defining financial aid R
policies); O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 965-66 (discussing NCAA’s reliance on full-
tuition scholarships as justification for not compensating student-athletes).
62. For a further discussion of a student-athlete’s time commitments, see
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. R
63. See generally OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art.12.1.2 (listing compensa- R
tion restrictions).
64. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art.12.1.2 (a) (specifying restrictions R
on student-athlete compensation).
65. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art.12.1.2 (e)(f)(g) (specifying addi- R
tional restrictions on student-athlete compensation).
11
Price: O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Cinderell
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015





      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 12 31-MAR-15 11:49
190 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 179
erential treatment because of his student-athlete status.66 Nor can a
student-athlete receive more money because of his reputation.67
A student-athlete may have a paying job as long as he is paid
only for the work he performs and is paid the rate for similar ser-
vices in that region.68  However, with the amount of time spent on
athletics and academics, Division I basketball and FBS athletes may
not have time to maintain a paying job.69  Although an athlete may
be compensated for instructions or camps, there are compensation
limitations.70  Curiously, a student-athlete may not use his name to
promote a lesson, camp, or his own business.71  However, an institu-
tional, charitable, educational, or nonprofit organization can use a
student-athlete’s NIL “to support its charitable or educational activi-
ties or to support activities considered incidental to the student-ath-
lete’s participation in intercollegiate athletics” as long as certain
conditions are met.72
Nearly everyone but the student-athlete and his family mem-
bers can profit from his NIL and the exposure that his NIL brings
66. See generally OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.1.2.1 (noting non- R
comprehensive list of prohibited forms of pay). The Bylaws list different types of
improper payments such as: salary, gratuity or compensation; division or split of
surplus; educational expenses; expenses, awards and benefits; payment based on
performance; preferential treatment, benefits or services; and prize for participa-
tion in institution’s promotional activity. See id. arts. 12.1.2.1(1)-(7).
67. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.4.1.1 (ruling that student-ath- R
letes cannot make more money because they are student-athletes).
68. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.4.1 (discussing limitations on R
student-athlete employment compensation). See also sources cited, supra note 69 R
(expanding upon language in article 12.4.1).
69. For a further discussion of a student-athlete’s time commitments, see
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. R
70. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.4.2.1 (listing limitations on R
compensation for camps and other instructional activities).
71. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.4.2.1–12.4.4 (expanding on R
limitation of student-athletes’ use of image and likeness).  For example, the Bylaws
state that “[a] student-athlete may establish his or her own business, provided the
student-athlete’s name, photograph, appearance or athletics reputation are not
used to promote the business.” See id. art. 12.4.4.
72. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.5.1.1. (listing guidelines that R
specific types of organizations and student-athletes must follow when student-ath-
lete’s NIL will be used to promote specific activities for organizations).
12
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to the football or basketball program.73  The revenue discrepancy is
“inequitable.”74
C. NCAA Violations
With stringent rules come violations, and for years, the NCAA
has dealt with seemingly petty violations in different ways.75  Boost-
ers have plagued the NCAA, leading to program closures, wiping
away of seasons, and game suspensions in the cases of Southern
Methodist University football, Michigan basketball, and Miami foot-
ball, to name a few.76  Interestingly, penalties seem to be handed
down on a case-by-case basis.
For example, when members of the Ohio State University foot-
ball team, including the star quarterback, received tattoos in ex-
change for signed memorabilia, the suspension was postponed so
the players could play in the 2011 Sugar Bowl.77  Interestingly, the
73. See, e.g., DOSH, supra note 55, at 14 (discussing different college football R
programs’ licensing agreements).  In 2012, Boise State University, after appearing
in the 2007 and 2010 Fiesta Bowl games, “had grown to having over 350 licensees
and generated more than $1 million in royalties.” See id. (discussing Boise State’s
increase in licensing revenue). Another major example is the University of Ore-
gon: “Currently the University shares 50 percent of net revenue from licensing
with the athletic department. . . .  Total licensing revenue for the University has
grown from $750,000 to $2.25 million from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2011,
coinciding with successful football seasons.” See id. (discussing Oregon’s 50% split
between football program and school of athletic department licensing profits).
For a further discussion of the use of a student-athletes’ NIL, see supra notes 67-72 R
and accompanying text.
74. See Lee Goldman, Note, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students be Paid
to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 207 (1990) (“It is inequitable that student-
athletes, who generate millions of dollars for the university, must scrounge for
basic expenses and struggle through their classes.  It is hypocritical for the NCAA
to restrict payments to student-athletes when its member universities continue to
seek new ways of increasing revenues . . . .” (citations omitted)).
75. For a discussion of some past NCAA violations ways the NCAA has ad-
dressed the violations, see infra notes 76-79, 82-83, and the text accompanying R
those notes.
76. See A List of the Worst Scandals in College Sports, ESPN (July 22, 2012), http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?id=8189312 (listing worst NCAA scandals from
1947-2012). For example, Southern Methodist University (“SMU”) received the
“death penalty” in 1987 for an under-the-table fund—of which SMU’s then Ath-
letic Director was aware—it had used to pay football players. See id.  Another
booster-laden scandal lost the University of Michigan five basketball seasons in-
cluding two NCAA Division I Championship games. See id.  Nevin Shapiro, a
booster for the University of Miami, allegedly gave players money, cars, vacations,
and paid for prostitutes. See id.
77. See Ohio State Football Players Sanctioned, ESPN (Dec. 26, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5950873 (reporting that quarterback Ter-
relle Pryor and four of his teammates were suspended by NCAA for first five games
of subsequent season for selling rings, jerseys, and awards for tattoos, however,
could still play in Sugar Bowl). See also Dan Wetzel, Pryor’s Acts Expose Charade of
College Athletics, YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 3, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/
13
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CEO of the Sugar Bowl “lobb[ied] hard” to ensure the star student-
athletes played in his bowl game.78  Further, when Johnny Manziel
inadvertently violated the rules, Texas A&M University proposed
penalties to the NCAA for the violation, likely preventing the NCAA
from a possible tougher sanction.79
As quarterback, Manziel led a Texas A&M football team that
brought in over $52 million dollars of revenue in 2012.80  Manziel’s
winning of the Heisman Trophy “produced more than $1.8 million
media impressions, which translates into $37 million in media ex-
posure for A&M,” not including the “increases from merchandise
sales, ticket requests or donations to the school.”81  Unfortunately
pryor-acts-expose-charade-college-212300587—ncaaf.html (discussing Pryor’s
NCAA violations).  See also, Dan Wetzel, Focus on OSU, Big Ten Brass, Not Pryor,
YAHOO! SPORTS (June 1, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/focus-osu-big-ten-
brass-205000210—ncaaf.html (arguing that Pryor was scapegoat in Ohio State
scandal).  Wetzel goes through a history of what happened in the Ohio State scan-
dal, arguing that someone in the Ohio State Athletic Department leaked informa-
tion about the improper benefits that Pryor and other members of the football
team had received. See id.  He notes how most of the news reporting the situation
focused on Pryor’s future at Ohio State, not “the men in charge . . . all of whom
mishandled the case.” See id.
78. See Dan Wetzel, Johnny Manziel’s Suspension Exposes Ridiculousness of NCAA’s
Double Standards, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/
ncaaf—johnny-manziel-s-suspension-exposes-ridiculousness-of-ncaa-s-double-stan-
dards-012517037.html (discussing irony behind Terrelle Pryor and Ohio State
player’s sanctions).  Sugar Bowl CEO Paul Hoolahan said “not only did he lobby
hard for Pryor and the others to get a reprieve but also that the powers that be
listened to him.” See id.
79. See Joint Statement from Texas A&M and the NCAA, AGGIE ATHLETICS (Aug.
28, 2013), available at http://www.aggieathletics.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=
209242479 [hereinafter “Joint Statement”] (discussing penalties proposed by
A&M).  Texas A&M proposed to the NCAA three “penalties” as punishment for
Manziel and the Texas A&M football program: (1) Manziel could not play in the
first half of A&M’s season opener against Rice University; (2) Manziel had to ad-
dress his team about the situation and what he learned; and (3) Texas A&M had to
revise its future education “concerning student-athlete autographs for individuals
with multiple items.” See id.  When asked about the punishment, the NCAA Vice
President of Academic and Membership Affairs stated the following: “unfortu-
nately, some individuals’ sole motivation in seeking an autograph is for resale.  It is
important that schools are cognizant and educate student-athletes about situations
in which there is a strong likelihood that the autograph seeker plans to resell the
items.” See id.
80. See Sean Gregory, Johnny Manziel “Suspension” Is The World’s Most Confusing
Punishment, TIME (Aug. 29, 2013), http://keepingscore.blogs.time.com/2013/
08/29/johnny-manziel-suspension-the-worlds-most-confusing-punishment/#ixzz2s
Gfv4nAd (discussing double-standard of NCAA penalty).
81. See A&M football Season, Manziel Generate $37 Million in Media Exposure Reve-
nue, THE BATTALION ONLINE (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.thebatt.com/a-m-foot
ball-season-manziel-generate-37-million-in-media-exposure-revenue-1.2973571#
.Uu-jEHl9lg1 (noting how much money Texas A&M made from Manziel winning
Heisman Trophy).
14
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for Johnny Manziel, the NCAA penalized him for signing auto-
graphs regardless of whether or not he profited.82
In 2013, the NCAA investigated Manziel for allegedly accepting
payment for signing autographs.83  Under the NCAA Bylaws, a stu-
dent-athlete cannot participate in his respective sport if he
“[a]ccepts any remuneration for or permits the use of [his] name
or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or
use of a commercial product or service of any kind” or “[r]eceives
remuneration for endorsing a commercial product or service.”84  In
addition, if a student-athlete’s photo or name appears on commer-
cial items “or is used to promote a commercial product sold by an
individual or agency,” the student-athlete must “take steps to stop
such an activity,” unless the photograph is sold by an individual or
agency for “private use.”85  In other words, Manziel should have
known that the autographs he signed would be sold for money and
he should have stopped signing or told the people for whom he
signed not to sell them.86  Unfortunately, determining whether a
person asking for an autograph will turn around and sell it is not
that simple.87
82. See Wetzel, supra note 78 (“In other words, the NCAA couldn’t prove R
Manziel was paid by memorabilia dealers to sign his own name on pictures of him-
self.  They instead hit him because it was obvious that the thousands of items he
autographed were certainly going to be sold.”). See also Joint Statement, supra note
79 (discussing penalties A&M proposed). R
83. See Zac Ellis, Autograph Broker Says Johnny Manziel Accepted $7,500 for Signing
Helmets, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 6, 2013), http://college-football.si.com/2013/
08/06/johnny-manziel-autograph-broker-ncaa/ (discussing Manziel investigation).
84. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.5.2.1 (a)(b) (explaining R
NCAA’s rule against student-athletes profiting off of their NIL).
85. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.5.2.2 (explaining student-ath- R
letes obligations regarding improper use of image and likeness on promotional
products).
86. See Gregory, supra note 80 (“Texas A&M . . . and so many others already R
profit off of Manziel.  At the same time, if Manziel inadvertently permits another
person to profit off his name, he gets punished.  And how, exactly, do you inadver-
tently offer someone permission to do something? Stubbing my toe: that’s
inadvertent . . . .”).
87. See Wright Thompson, The Trouble With Johnny, ESPN (July 30, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9521439/heisman-winner-johnny-
manziel-celebrity-derail-texas-aggies-season-espn-magazine (discussing frequency
that Manziel was sought for autographs).  For example, Johnny Manziel’s parents
always seemed to have piles of items for him to sign for other people. See id.
(describing amount of objects Manziel would be asked to sign).  One time Manziel
signed helmet decals for a man who “accosted” him and told him they were for
deployed troops, only to find later that the decals had been affixed to helmets and
sold on eBay.  See Andy Staples, Johnny Manziel Discussed Autograph Incident in July SI
Interview, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 5, 2013), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
college-football/news/20130805/johnny-manziel-ncaa-autograph-probe/
#ixzz2sGnez5bc (elaborating on Manziel’s story and inadvertent violation).  Addi-
15
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Manziel’s penalty exposed more of the double standard be-
hind the NCAA’s use of  student-athletes’ NIL.88  With the amount
of money and exposure that college athletes bring to their schools,
shouldn’t they have a stake in the profit?89
IV. ANTITRUST
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to pro-
mote competition and prevent monopolies in trade and commerce
throughout the United States.90  Antitrust practices harm competi-
tionally, when Johnny and his roommate were in a Tuscaloosa hotel before their
game against Alabama in 2012, a man with a duffle bag full of items shoved his foot
in the door and walked in the room with Johnny, and asked him to sign auto-
graphs for him, which Manziel did for free. See id. (telling another story about
someone hounding Manziel for autographs).
88. See Michael Rosenberg, NCAA Amateurism Rules Unfair, But Manziel Not One
to Challenge Them, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 5, 2013), http://sportsillustrated.cnn
.com/college-football/news/20130805/johnny-manziel-ncaa/#ixzz2sGoFQuqU
(discussing discrepancies in rules).  “NCAA rules are antiquated, grossly unfair,
absurd and almost offensive.  If a coach can make $5 million a year because he has
great players, a player should be allowed to sell his autograph, his picture, a pint of
blood or tattoo space on his left arm.” See id. (alluding to past scandals calling into
question NCAA’s amateurism policies). Donors paid $20,000 to sit at a table with
Johnny Manziel; the $20,000 went right back into Texas A&M’s football team. See
Chris Eichelberger, Manziel’s Heisman Brought Texas A&M About $20,000, School
Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-01/
manziel-s-heisman-brought-texas-a-m-about-20-000-school-says.html (elaborating
on amount of money Manziel’s Heisman victory brought into Texas A&M). In ad-
dition, “Texas A&M received $9.7 million in TV revenue for the 2012 season, and
annual increases have already been determined through the end of the SEC’s con-
tract in 2023-2024 with CBS and 2033-2034 with ESPN.” See id. Texas A&M raised
$740 million dollars in donations and pledges in 2012-2013. See Allen Reed, Texas
A&M Breaks Fundraising Record With $740 Million in Donations, THE EAGLE (Sept. 17,
2013), http://www.theeagle.com/news/local/article_82266d1a-11c0-543b-b75a-
4c3613357abe.html (discussing Texas A&M’s profit and reason for profit includ-
ing, grants to research, library, and alumni foundations). See also Chris Hutson,
Football, Manziel Credited For Record Texas A&M Fundraising Windfall, NBC SPORTS
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/09/17/football-
manziel-credited-for-record-texas-am-fundraising-windfall/ (discussing money
raised by Texas A&M in 2012-2013).  When asked about the money raised, the
Texas A&M Foundation President, Ed Davis stated the following:
People ask me all the time if you have a winning football team, do you
raise more money . . . . in an era where we are in, effectively, in the news
everywhere and you have a young man like our quarterback who has been
a media magnet and you have the success you have, I do think that eu-
phoria does spill over into success in fundraising.
See id.
89. For a further discussion of the money that college athletes make for their
schools, see supra notes 73, 80-81 and accompanying text. R
90. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (2004).  Section 1, restricting trusts and restraints of
trade, states the following:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any
16
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tion in the market, which harms the consumers in that market.91
Some examples of antitrust or anticompetitive behavior include
price-fixing and boycotting.92  Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act prevents two or more entities from making any agreement, act-
ing in concert, or engaging in any conspiracy that unlawfully re-
strains trade.93  Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits
monopolization and attempted monopolization of market power.94
In both instances, there must be a defined market.95
In O’Bannon, the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA violated Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.96  To prove a violation of Section 1,
plaintiffs must show: (1) an agreement among two or more persons
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to
be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
See id. § 1 (preventing unlawful restraints on trade). Section 2, restricting monopo-
lies, reads as follows:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
See id. § 2 (preventing monopolies).
91. See WONG, supra note 3, at 453 (discussing effects of antitrust practices). R
92. See id. (listing examples of antitrust behavior).
93. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (stating elements of Section).  For the language of
Section 1, see supra note 90. R
94. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (stating elements of Section).  For the language of
Section 2, see supra note 90. R
95. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985-86 (citations omitted) (citing Super-
market of Homes v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th
Cir., 1986)) (noting importance of defining a market).  In Supermarket, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the “[p]roof that defendant’s activities had an impact upon com-
petition in the relevant market is ‘an absolutely essential element . . . .” See id. In
O’Bannon, the Court elaborates on how to define a market. See id. at 986 (noting
that relevant market “encompasses notions of geography as well as product use,
quality, and description.” (citations omitted) (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal.,
252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001))).
96. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (discussing lawsuit against NCAA).  This Part discusses how to
prove a violation of Section 1.  See sources cited and accompanying text, infra notes
91-114.  For purposes of a thorough antitrust analysis, to prove a Section 2 viola-
tion, plaintiffs must establish that (1) one entity controls or attempts to control the
market power and (2) that the entity has used unlawful means to dominate the
market power. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (stating elements of monopolization); WONG,
supra note 3, at 455-56 (discussing elements of monopolization).  The purpose of
Section 2 is not to punish those companies with a natural monopoly, but to pre-
vent those companies from discouraging the rise of similar products in the market
that may compete with them. See WONG, supra note 3, at 455-56.
17
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or entities; (2) the agreement unlawfully restrains trade; and (3)
the activity affects interstate commerce.97  Courts apply one of three
tests when determining whether a Section 1 violation exists: a per se
analysis, a rule of reason analysis,98 or a quick-look analysis.99
A per se analysis applies when an agreement so obviously re-
strains trade in the market, such as one setting the price of a certain
product.100  If they show existence of an agreement that destruc-
tively restrains trade, the plaintiffs need not show harm, and the
defendants do not have the opportunity to show justifications, or
procompetitive effects, of the restraint.101
Courts apply a rule of reason analysis for less obvious restraints
on trade.102  To succeed under the rule of reason analysis, the
97. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 984  (citing Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1062 (in-
ternal citations omitted)).
98. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984) (noting when to use per se analysis versus rule of reason
test).  In Board of Regents, the Court stated that when there are restraints on trade, a
rule of reason test must be used to conduct “a fair evaluation of the competitive
character” of the restraints. See id. at 103.  The Court ruled that a per se analysis
should be used when “surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticom-
petitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of the chal-
lenged conduct.” See id. at 103-04.
99. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (discussing previ-
ous cases in which “quick-look” analysis was used and giving examples of “quick-
look” analysis).
100. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103-04 (“Per se rules are invoked when
surrounding circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so
great as to render unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct.”).
See also WONG, supra note 3, at 453-53 (“Practices that are deemed illegal per se are R
those that fall within a division of conduct that is inherently anticompetitive, like
price-fixing, horizontal agreements, and group boycotts.  If the conduct is found to
be illegal per se, the court will not inquire into the business purpose or the actual
effect of the offending practice.”).
101. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)(citing Nat’l Soc’y of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. U.S., 425 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“Per se liability is reserved for only
those agreements that are “so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality.”).  In Texaco, the Supreme Court
states that they have “generally expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules” when the
impact of the alleged anticompetitive practices is “not immediately obvious.” See
id. (internal citations omitted) (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
See also WONG, supra note 3, at 453-54 (“In cases where the per se analysis is used, R
the defense does not have an opportunity to defend the offending agreement the
defense’s emphasis is on requesting that the rule of reason analysis be applied
instead.”).  In his book, Wong cites an excerpt from Northern Pacific Railway Com-
pany v. U.S. in which the Supreme Court elaborates on those activities that are
subject to a per se analysis: “There are certain agreements or practices which be-
cause of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elabo-
rate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use.” See id. at 454 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
102. See, e.g., American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183,
203 (2010) (citations omitted) (noting that rule of reason analysis should be used
18
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plaintiffs must to show: (1) that there is an agreement between two
entities, (2) that the agreement adversely affects competition in the
defined market, and (3) that the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement outweigh the procompetitive goals of the restraint.103
After the plaintiffs show an unlawful agreement in the defined mar-
ket and that the agreement has anticompetitive effects, the burden
shifts to the defendant to assert procompetitive effects of the al-
leged restraint.104  Then, the court will weigh the anticompetitive
effects against the procompetitive effects.105  If the court finds that
the defendant has shown adequate procompetitive effects, the bur-
den will shift back to the plaintiffs to show that the procompetitive
goals can be achieved in a less restrictive manner.106
Plaintiffs have challenged sports leagues under Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act.107  However, competition drives sports
leagues; therefore, some restraints on competition are necessary to
when restraints on competition are necessary); Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-04
(determining proper time to use per se analysis or rule of reason analysis); Board of
Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918) (providing rule of rea-
son analysis). See also WONG, supra note 3, at 454 (“The rule of reason analysis R
applies to conduct that is not manifestly anticompetitive.”).
103. See WONG, supra note 3, at 454 (outlining burden-shifting rule of reason R
analysis).  For a further discussion of the rule of reason analysis, see sources cited
supra note 102 and accompanying text. R
104. See WONG, supra note 3, at 454 (discussing defendants’ burden in rule of R
reason analysis).  A defendant “will attempt to prove that there is a legitimate busi-
ness reason for the restraint, and that the restraint in question is in the least re-
strictive form.  The defense will argue that without such restrictions, the business
will be adversely affected and there will be a negative impact on the welfare of the
consumer.” See id.
105. See City of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 244 (“[T]he court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its ef-
fect, actual or probable.”).
106. See Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991)) (noting
burden shift to plaintiffs to show least restrictive means).
107. Commonly, athletes or owners challenge a league under Section 1, alleg-
ing that the league is acting in a way to restrain trade. See, e.g., Clarett v. National
Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir., 2004) (ruling that NFL’s eligibility rules
are exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173,
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (determining NFL draft was illegal restraint on trade as it
existed in 1968); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (determining that
Rozelle Rule was unreasonable restraint on free agency in NFL); Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.) (creating free agency
in professional baseball).  Alternatively, rival leagues have challenged established
leagues under Section 2.  See, e.g., U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League,
842 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (2nd Cir. 1988) (affirming decision that NFL did not have
monopoly power over television networks); American Football League v. Nat’l
Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963) (determining that NFL did not have
monopoly power over relevant market).
19
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have a successful league and maintain the proper competitive bal-
ance.108  Thus, courts will apply a rule of reason analysis to antitrust
claims against sports leagues to weigh the anticompetitive effects of
the restraint against the procompetitive justifications of the
restraint.109
The NCAA, whose mission is academic in nature, is recognized
as a nonprofit organization.110  Interestingly, however, the NCAA
dominates intercollegiate athletics.111  NCAA members are bound
by the NCAA Bylaws.112  This situation is very profitable for the
NCAA and its “current revenues total approximately $800 mil-
lion.”113  The NCAA’s unrestricted assets currently total around
$530 million.114  By exerting dominant control over intercollegiate
108. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (discussing NCAA’s restraint, Court says: “a certain degree of
cooperation is necessary if the type of competition that petitioner and its member
institutions seek to market is to be preserved.”).
109. See generally id. at 101 (discussing why rule of reason analysis is appropri-
ate analysis of antitrust in sports).  The Court notes, that sports leagues, the NCAA
in this case, “would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the
competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed.” See id.
The Court goes on to list many agreements that restrain competition in the NCAA
such as, “the size of the field, the number of players on a team, and the extent to
which physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed . . . .” See id.
110. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, The NCAA Budget: Where the Money
Goes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/ncaa-budget-where-money-
goes (last updated Oct. 15, 2013) [hereinafter “NCAA Budget”] (“The NCAA
maintains its nonprofit status because it is an association of colleges and universi-
ties sharing a common academic mission.”). See also WONG, supra note 3, at 504 R
(discussing college organizations common “nonprofit” defense against antitrust
claims).
111. See Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D.
Ind. 1990) (discussing NCAA’s purpose and prestige). See also NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N, Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/
membership (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (“More than 1,200 schools, conferences
and affiliate organizations collectively invest in improving experiences of student-
athletes—on the field, in the classroom, and in life.”).  When determining the
relevant market in O’Bannon, the Court discusses the NCAA’s prowess. See
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965-68 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (discussing FBS and Division I basketball in NCAA).
112. See NCAA CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, art. 1.3.2 (“Member institutions R
shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation . . . .”). See also Marc
Edelman, Note, Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64
CASE WESTERN L. REV. 61, 66 (2013) (“Members do not have the chance to opt out
of rules based on their financial preference, nor do they have the right to opt out
on moral grounds.” (citations omitted)).
113. See NCAA Budget, supra note 110 (discussing NCAA’s budget and reve- R
nue).  The site notes that the NCAA’s revenue comes mainly from television and
marketing rights fees. See id. (elaborating on revenue). See also WONG, supra note
3, at 20 (noting majority of NCAA revenue comes from television contracts and R
ticket sales).
114. See NCAA Budget, supra note 110 (describing assets). R
20
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athletics while reaping significant revenues, does the NCAA illegally
restrain competition because student-athletes cannot receive
compensation?115
Before the 1970s, the NCAA essentially avoided liability for an-
titrust claims, arguing its primary purpose is educational and non-
commercial.116  In 1984, the University of Oklahoma and the
University of Georgia filed a lawsuit against the NCAA after the
NCAA threatened to discipline the schools for negotiating indepen-
dent television contracts.117  The Supreme Court upheld the lower
court’s decision that the NCAA violated Section 1 and was operat-
ing as a “classic cartel” and conducted unlawful restriction of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.118 The Regents decision was the first
successful antitrust challenge of the NCAA.119  Since 1984, the
115. See OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 12.1.2.1 (listing and elaborating R
on prohibited forms of pay for NCAA student-athletes).
116. See WONG, supra note 3, at 504 (laying foundation for role of Sherman R
Act in NCAA).  In the past, “college athletic organizations have been successful in
arguing that the antitrust laws were not applicable to them because college athlet-
ics are not ‘trade’ or ‘commerce’ as defined by the Sherman Act.” See id.  See also
MATTHEW J. MITTEN, ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 224-25 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing history behind NCAA’s lack of antitrust
regulation).  Mitten quotes former Ohio State University football coach Woody
Hayes as stating that “the man who plays college football and does not graduate
has been cheated.” See id. (internal citations omitted).
117. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 95 (1984) (discussing history of case).  The schools, part of the College
Football Association (“CFA”), negotiated a television contract with the National
Broadcasting Company (“NBC”), independent of the NCAA’s television deal. See
id.  After that contract, the NCAA “publically announced that it would take discipli-
nary action against any CFA member that complied with the CFA-NBC contract.”
See id.
118. See id. at 95-96 (“The District Court then concluded that the NCAA con-
trols over college football are those of a ‘classic cartel’. . . .”).  The Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision in part, and
reversed in part, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
See generally id.  “Today we hold only that the record supports the District Court’s
conclusion that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institu-
tions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather than
enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.” See id. at 120.
See also WONG, supra note 3, at 506 (noting how Supreme Court affirmed lower R
court’s decision that NCAA policy violated Sherman Act).
119. See WONG, supra note 3, at 506. Wong states the following about the R
Court’s decision in Board of Regents:
This decision was important for three reasons: (1) it was the first success-
ful challenge of the NCAA based on antitrust theory; (2) it had a signifi-
cant impact on the NCAA and intercollegiate athletic departments by
reducing television revenues for most institutions; and (3) the U.S. Su-
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NCAA tends to settle claims alleging antitrust violations.120  How-
ever, recent cases, especially after O’Bannon, have definite potential
to change the NCAA because plaintiffs are able to taste victory.121
V. O’BANNON V. NCAA: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Current and former student-athletes sued the NCAA in the
Northern District of California under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
arguing that the NCAA exercises an unlawful restraint of trade over
Division I basketball and FBS student-athletes’ NIL.122  The follow-
ing subsections provide an in-depth look into the court’s antitrust
analysis and decision.
A. Relevant Markets and Restraints
The plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA restrained trade in two
markets: the college education market and the group licensing
market.123  Specifically, the plaintiffs argued, because the NCAA
does not allow student-athletes to receive compensation for the li-
censed use of their NIL in the two markets, the NCAA unlawfully
restrains trade.124
1. The College Education Market
According to the plaintiffs, the college education market is the
market in which the Division I and FBS schools compete to recruit
the elite high school athletes.125  These NCAA schools “sell” the stu-
dents on a “unique bundle of goods and services,” such as room,
board, tuition, meals, medical treatment, top-of-the-line facilities,
120. For a further discussion of the NCAA and the Sherman Act, see cases
cited infra notes 223-224 and accompanying text. R
121. For a further discussion of the impact of O’Bannon, see infra notes 213- R
220, 236-262 and the text accompanying the notes. R
122. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (introducing background of case).
123. See id. at 965 (stating two markets in which plaintiffs challenge NCAA’s
restraint).
124. See id. at 985. (discussing plaintiffs’ claims specifically).
125. See id. at 965-68, 986 (explaining and defining college education
market).
22
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and academic tutoring.126  In return, the student-athletes give their
athletic services and the use of their NIL.127
The plaintiffs established the uniqueness of Division I and FBS
schools through testimony providing that high school recruits
skilled enough to play Division I basketball or FBS football, do.128
In rebuttal, the NCAA, hoping to expand the market definition,129
argued that there are other avenues for elite high school recruits to
pursue, such as FCS schools, Division II, Division III, non-NCAA
schools, or foreign professional leagues.130  To determine the scope
of the market, the court considered whether foreign leagues and
other NCAA divisions have “actual or potential ability to deprive”
FBS and Division I schools of “significant levels of business.”131
Concluding that the other schools do not deprive Division I schools
of significant business,132 the court found that Division I basketball
126. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 966-68 (describing unique bundle of ser-
vices NCAA D-I and FBS football schools offer student-athlete recruits).  The court
notes that the plaintiffs presented evidence at trial, “including testimony from
both experts and lay witnesses,” establishing that the schools do compete and that
the schools in competition are the only sellers of the unique services in the rele-
vant market. See id. at 965-66.
127. See id. at 965-66 (discussing exchange between student-athletes and
NCAA member schools regarding quid pro quo arrangement, relying on testimony
of economic expert Dr. Noll).
128. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 966 (citing to expert witness testimony of
Dr. Noll regarding number of four and five star recruits that accept D-I basketball
and FBS football scholarships).  Dr. Noll testified that more than ninety-eight per-
cent of four and five star football recruits, between 2007 and 2011, accepted schol-
arship offers at FBS schools. See id.  Further, he noted that about ninety-five, five
star basketball recruits that were offered D-I scholarships accepted one. See id.
129. See generally id. at 966-68, 986 (discussing plaintiffs’ definition of market
and NCAA’s attempt to expand market to include other intercollegiate leagues,
Divisions, foreign leagues, and professional leagues).
130. See id. at 966-67 (“The only potential substitutes that the NCAA has iden-
tified are the opportunities offered by schools in other divisions, collegiate athlet-
ics associations, or minor and foreign professional sports leagues.”).
131. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 986-87 (noting Court’s process to deter-
mine market).
132. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 987 (refuting NCAA’s claim that FCS and
non-Division I schools compete with FBS schools because Division I and FBS
schools provide significant differences in level of competition, facilities, coaching
salaries, and exposure). Other programs “typically offer a lower level of athletic
competition, inferior training facilities, lower-paid coaches, and fewer opportuni-
ties to play in front of large crowds and on television.” See id.  Additionally, the
court found that the cost of attending FBS and Division I basketball schools has
increased, but student-athletes continue to attend.  See id. at 988 (citing Lucas
Auto. Eng’g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 275 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir.2001))
(refuting NCAA’s argument that other leagues and divisions compete with Division
I basketball and FBS schools because recruits accept Division I basketball and FBS
offers despite price increase).  Further, the court concluded that foreign leagues
and relevant professional leagues are not adequate substitutes for FBS and Division
I basketball schools, because they do not offer recruits the opportunity to obtain a
23
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schools and FBS schools operate in a distinct college education
market.133
2. The Group Licensing Market
The plaintiffs also identified a group licensing market with
three submarkets: a submarket to use student-athletes’ NIL in live
game telecasts, a submarket to use student-athletes’ NIL in vide-
ogames, and a submarket to use student-athletes’ NIL in archival
footage—such as rebroadcasting.134  Generally, the group licensing
market is one in which the student-athletes could join together to
offer and sell group NIL licenses to schools, third-party licensing
companies, or media companies.135
a. Submarket for Live Game Telecasts
First, the plaintiffs argued that without the NCAA’s rules, stu-
dent-athletes could sell group licenses for the use of their NIL to
television networks for live game telecasts.136  The plaintiffs relied
on common NIL provisions in contracts between the NCAA and
television networks.137  The NCAA unsuccessfully argued that sports
higher education or to play regularly on television. See id. at 987 (discussing why
professional and foreign leagues do not compete in same relevant market).  The
NCAA’s evidence supports the plaintiffs’ argument that Division I basketball and
FBS schools “command a significantly larger domestic television audience than vir-
tually every other football or basketball league, with the exceptions of the NFL and
NBA . . . .” See id. See also Rock v. NCAA, 2013 WL 4479815, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
16, 2013) (concluding that Division II and NAIA football do not compete in same
relevant market as Division I football).
133. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 987-88 (citing Rock, 2013 WL 4479815, at
*13) (concluding that NCAA FBS and Division I basketball schools offer unique
goods and services).  The court determined that “the qualitative differences be-
tween the opportunities offered by FBS football and Division I basketball schools
and those offered by other schools and sports leagues illustrate that FBS football
schools and Division I basketball schools operate in a distinct market.” See id.
134. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 968-71 (elaborating on three types of sub-
markets in which NCAA member schools license student-athletes’ NIL).  For a fur-
ther discussion of the group licensing market, see sources cited infra notes 136-149 R
and accompanying text.
135. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 968 (providing general overview of group
licensing market).
136. See id. at 968-69 (discussing plaintiffs’ argument regarding submarket for
live game telecasts).
137. See id. at 968-69 (citing to NIL provisions in television network con-
tracts).  The court cites to the NCAA’s contract with CBS for the rights to telecast
the NCAA March Madness basketball tournament:
The Network, its sponsors, their advertising representatives and the sta-
tions carrying the telecasts of the games will have the right to make ap-
propriate references (including without limitation, use of pictures) to
NCAA and the universities and colleges of the teams, the sites, the games
and the participants in and others identified with the games and in the telecast-
24
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broadcasters’ “primary reason” for entering into a licensing agree-
ment with an event organizer is to “gain exclusive access to the facil-
ity where the event will occur.”138  The NCAA also argued that
student-athletes are precluded from asserting any rights of publicity
in the use of their NIL under the First Amendment and state laws—
an argument which the court rejected.139  In conclusion, the court
noted that a license to a single student-athlete’s NIL is not valuable,
unless bundled with licenses to other student-athletes’ NIL.140
However, without the NCAA’s challenged rules, FBS football and D-
I basketball teams and players could create and sell those group
licenses.141
b. Submarket for Videogames
Second, the plaintiffs argued that without the NCAA’s rules, a
submarket would exist for group licenses to use student-athletes’
NIL in videogames.142  Plaintiffs argued that developers would seek
ing thereof, provided that the same do not constitute endorsements of a
commercial product.
See id.  (emphasis added) (citing trial Exhibit 2104).  The NCAA’s contract with
CBS for certain basketball games throughout the season contains a “nearly identi-
cal” provision.  See id.  Also, part of a provision in an agreement between the FBS
teams and Fox Broadcasting Company for the rights of the telecast to several bowl
games in recent years states that “the event organizer will be solely responsible for
ensuring that Fox has ‘the rights to use the name and likeness, photographs and
biographies of all participants, game officials, cheerleaders’ and other individuals
connected to the game.” See id. (citing trial Exhibit).
138. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (citing trial transcript and dismissing
NCAA’s argument because broadcasters must have licensing agreements with visit-
ing teams who do not control access to event facility as well as home teams).
139. See id. at 994 (referencing C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 826 (8th Cir., 2007))
(“[E]ven if some television networks believed that student-athletes lacked publicity
rights in the use of their names, images, and likenesses, they may have still sought
to acquire these rights as a precautionary measure. Businesses often negotiate li-
censes to acquire uncertain rights.”).
140. See id. at 969 (“A license to use an individual student-athlete’s name, im-
age, and likeness during a game telecast would not have any value to a television
network unless it was bundled with licenses to use every other participating stu-
dent-athlete’s name, image, and likeness.”).
141. See id. at 969, 994 (concluding a demand for group licenses exists with
respect to live game telecasts).  The court stated, absent the restrictions, student-
athletes would sell the licenses directly to the networks or through an intermediate
buyer, like a third-party licensing company. See id. at 994.
142. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (citing to trial transcript and
testimony of EA Sports’ executive Joe Linzner).  The trial transcript provides evi-
dence that companies, like EA, must negotiate licenses with professional leagues
and teams for their intellectual property rights, as well as with the athletes for the
use of their NIL. See id.  The point being, that “EA would be interested in acquir-
ing the same rights from student-athletes . . . to produce college sports-themed
videogames, if it were permitted to do so.” See id. (internal citations omitted).
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to acquire group licenses to use the student-athletes’ NIL because
developers want to make their games authentic.143  The NCAA ar-
gued that a demand for such licenses no longer exists because the
NCAA did not renew its license with EA;144 however, nothing indi-
cated on the record that the NCAA would not enter into a similar
videogame agreement in the future, especially because the agree-
ment was profitable, and no NCAA Bylaw prohibits future intellec-
tual property licensing to videogame developers.145  Thus, the
Court agreed with the plaintiffs that a submarket for group licenses
to use student-athletes’ NIL in videogames would exist without the
NCAA’s restrictions.146
c. Submarket for Re-Broadcasts, Advertisements, and Other
Archival Footage
Third, the plaintiffs argued that without the NCAA’s rules,
there would be a demand for group licenses to use student-athletes’
NIL in re-broadcasts, advertisements, and other types of archival
footage.147  During the trial, the plaintiffs detailed the language in
the contracts granting the Big 10 Network and Fox Sports Network
the right to use student-athletes’ NIL to promote games and events
on their channels.148  Although the NCAA licenses its archival foot-
age to third-party licensing company T3Media, and T3Media can-
not license footage of current NCAA student-athletes, T3Media
acquires current student-athletes’ consent to license future footage
while the student-athletes are still in college, indicating that a de-
mand for the licenses exists.149
B. Anticompetitive Effects Restraining the Competition
Under the rule of reason test, the student-athletes must show
that the NCAA unlawfully restrains the competition in the identi-
143. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (noting EA’s avatars’ similarity to real
NCAA student-athletes).  The court pointed to evidence from trial discussing the
similarities and stating the following: “The EA avatars played the same positions as
their real-life counterparts, wore the same jersey numbers and uniform accessories,
haled from the same home state, and shared the same height, weight, handedness,
and skin color.” See id. (citations omitted).
144. See id. (noting NCAA’s argument).
145. See id. (refuting NCAA’s argument).
146. See id. (agreeing with plaintiffs that a submarket would exist absent
NCAA’s rules).
147. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 970-971 (summarizing plaintiffs’
argument and noting submarket exists after considering plaintiffs’ evidence).
148. For a deeper look at the language of discussed contracts, see supra note
137. R
149. See id. (discussing T3Media’s role in NCAA licensing).
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fied markets, harming the student-athletes.150  The plaintiffs argued
that the NCAA’s rules impose strict limits on the compensation that
student-athletes may receive for the use of their NIL.151  The spe-
cific rules in contention include: (1) the prohibition on receiving
financial aid above the full grant-in-aid for athletic ability; (2) the
prohibition on receiving financial aid in excess of the cost of at-
tendance; (3) the prohibition on receiving compensation from
third parties based on a student-athlete’s athletic skill or ability; and
(4) the prohibition on a student-athlete endorsing a product,
whether he receives compensation or not.152  The plaintiffs con-
tend that these restrictions on compensation harm the competition
in both markets because the financial cap suppresses the value of
athletic scholarships.153  From the evidence and testimony
presented, the court found that the NCAA violated Section 1 within
the college education market, but not in the group licensing
market.154
150. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985 (discussing rule of reason test gener-
ally).  “Proof that defendant’s activities had an impact upon competition in the
relevant market is ‘an absolutely essential element of the rule of reason case.’” See
id. (citations omitted) (citing Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley
Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986)) (expressing importance of
defined market).  For a further discussion of the rule of reason analysis, see supra
notes 102-106 and accompanying text. R
151. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 971-73 (discussing challenged
restraint generally). See also OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4 at art. 12.1.2 (elabo- R
rating upon “Amateur Status” and listing prohibited forms of pay).  Under the
NCAA Bylaws, a student-athlete will lose amateur status if he “uses [his] athletics
skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport.” See id. at art.
12.1.2(a).
152. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 971-72 (citations omitted) (pro-
viding overview of plaintiffs’ claims against NCAA’s restrictions). See also OPERAT-
ING BYLAWS, supra note 4, arts. 12, 15 (explaining rules on maintaining amateur R
status and permitted financial aid).
153. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 972 (“[T]he NCAA has the power to and
does suppress the value of athletic scholarships through its grant-in-aid
rules . . . .”).  Scholarships amounts are capped at the cost of attendance, which
“‘includes the total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies,
transportation, and other expenses related to attendance’ at that school.  Because
it covers the cost of ‘supplies, transportation, and other expenses,’ the cost of at-
tendance is generally higher than the value of a full grant-in-aid.”  See id. at 971.
The difference “is typically a few thousand dollars.” See id. at 971-72.  The court
goes on to explain, if schools lowered the price set by the NCAA for athletic schol-
arships, “by offering any recruit a cash rebate, deferred payment, or other form of
direct compensation—that school may be subject to sanctions by the NCAA.” See
id. at 988.
154. For a further discussion, see infra notes 155-175 and accompanying text. R
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1. College Education Market
The student-athletes argued that the recruits are the buyers
and the FBS and Division I basketball schools are the sellers in the
college education market.155  Because these two types of NCAA
schools are the only sellers, they have the ability to fix the price that
the schools offer to the student-athletes for the athletes’ athletic
services and NIL licensing rights, creating a seller’s cartel.156  Plain-
tiffs contended, if schools could offer more than the amount cur-
rently allowed under the Bylaws, recruits would also consider
finances when choosing which college or university to attend.157
The NCAA argued that its member schools do not technically price-
fix because the student-athletes pay close to zero dollars due to the
athletic scholarships.158  The court rejected this argument, stating
that the transactions between a Division I basketball or a FBS foot-
ball school and a student-athlete “are not noncommercial” in na-
ture because each party offers something of value to the other.159
155. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 986 (discussing how NCAA is supplier in
market and recruits “accept [NCAA’s] offers”).  At trial, the plaintiffs put forth a
monopsony theory, arguing that the student-athletes are sellers and the schools are
buyers. See id. at 991-994 (discussing plaintiffs’ monopsony theory).  The NCAA
argued that this theory fails, because to violate the Sherman Act, the consumer
must be harmed; however, the court rejects the NCAA’s argument. See id. at 922
(stating NCAA’s argument is not supported by relevant case law).  The court recog-
nized that the plaintiffs’ monopsony theory was first introduced at trial, but stated
that their expert provided testimony to support this argument. See id. at 993 (“The
evidence presented at trial and the facts found here, as well as the law, support
both theories.”).
156. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 971-73, 988-93 (emphasis added) (discuss-
ing plaintiffs’ claim of unlawful restraint).  The court states, “FBS football and Divi-
sion I basketball schools are the only suppliers in the relevant market” with the
power to price fix. See id. at 988.  Further, the court references Dr. Daniel
Rubinfeld, the NCAA’s economic expert, who wrote in one of his books that the
NCAA is a cartel, defined as “a group of firms that impose a restraint.” See id. at
972 (citations omitted). See also OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 15.01.6 (de- R
fining maximum financial aid allowed to one individual).
157. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 972 (“If the grant-in-aid limit were higher,
schools would compete for the best recruits by offering them larger grants-in-aid.
Similarly, if total financial aid was not capped at the cost of attendance, schools
would compete for the best recruits by offering them compensation exceeding the
cost of attendance.”).
158. See id. at 988 (examining NCAA’s argument that schools do not price-fix
because student-athletes pay close to nothing).
159. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 988 (“This argument mischaracterizes the
commercial nature of the transactions between FBS football and Division I basket-
ball schools and their recruits.”).  The court referenced the Seventh Circuit’s opin-
ion in Agnew v. NCAA, which observed that “transactions between NCAA schools
and student-athletes are, to some degree, commercial in nature, and therefore
take place in a relevant market with respect to the Sherman Act.” See id. at 988-89
(citing Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012)).  Further, the NCAA
member schools “can make millions of dollars as a result of these transactions.” See
28
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Thus, because the NCAA fixes the scholarship amount member
schools may offer recruits, the NCAA exercises an unlawful restraint
on the college education market.160
2. Group Licensing Market
The plaintiffs provided testimony that the recruits could also
be sellers in the markets for their athletic services and NIL licensing
rights.161  The plaintiffs claimed that but for the NCAA rules, they
could join together to offer group licenses for the rights to their
NIL for (1) live game telecasts, (2) videogames, and (3) rebroad-
casts and other archival footage.162  The court did not find that the
plaintiffs identified any harm to the competition in the group li-
censing submarkets to use student-athletes’ NIL in live game tele-
casts or videogames.163  Nor did the court find an unlawful restraint
in the submarket to use student-athletes’ NIL in re-broadcasts, high-
lights, and other archival footage.164
More specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs did not
show that they would compete against one another to sell their NIL
because television networks must obtain NIL licenses of every
school and player in whichever conference, tournament, or game
the network is broadcasting.165  Because a single student-athlete’s
id. at 989 (citing Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340).  The court continued by ruling that
simply because “this price-fixing agreement operates by undervaluing the name,
image, and likeness rights that the recruits provide to the schools—rather than by
explicitly requiring schools to charge a specific monetary price—does not pre-
clude antitrust liability here.” See id.  See also Major League Baseball Properties,
Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 335 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“While the MLBP agreement does not specify a price to be charged, the effect of
the agreement clearly eliminates price competition between the [teams] for trade-
mark licenses. An agreement to eliminate price competition from the market is
the essence of price fixing.”).  In O’Bannon, the court cites to then-Judge
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, which supports Judge Wilken’s viewpoint that
undervaluing, or setting the price at zero, does not eliminate price-fixing. See id. at
990.
160. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 988 (concluding that price-fixing of stu-
dent-athletes’ athletic scholarships constitutes unlawful restraint of trade).
161. See id. 968 (discussing plaintiffs’ contention that absent NCAA rules stu-
dent-athletes would join to sell NIL licenses to their schools, licensing companies,
or media companies).
162. See generally id. (identifying plaintiffs’ claims in group licensing market).
163. See id. at 996-98 (concluding that plaintiffs have not identified harm in
either submarket for live game telecasts or videogames).
164. See id. at 998 (“[Plaintiffs] have not presented sufficient evidence to show
that the NCAA has imposed any restraints in this submarket.”).
165. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 994-95 (suggesting that student-athletes
would not compete in relevant market).  The court provided an example of how a
network would obtain a license to broadcast a game and determined that the
teams would not compete to sell the licenses to the networks because “the group
29
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NIL license would not have value alone, the student-athletes would
not compete to sell these licenses.166  Further, the networks already
compete to obtain NIL licenses from schools and conferences.167
Although the student-athletes may suffer because they do not re-
ceive compensation, the student-athletes failed to show harm to the
competition.168
Similarly, the court did not find harm to the competition in
the submarket for videogames because the developers would need
to acquire the NIL licenses for all student-athletes in specific sets of
teams.169  Accordingly, each team would have an equal interest in
“ensuring that the videogame developer acquired each of the
group licenses required to create its product.”170  Therefore, the
plaintiffs failed to show harm in the videogame submarket.171
Lastly, the court did not find an unlawful restraint in the sub-
market for rebroadcasts and other archival footage, because the
NCAA has designated T3Media as its agent in negotiating and man-
licenses would constitute perfect complements: that is, every group license would
have to be sold in order for any single group license to have value.” See id. at 995
(citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2471, 2487 (2013)).  In addition, the television network would only have to
obtain the licenses of those players in that specific conference, tournament, or
game. See id.  Thus, those specific student-athletes would not compete with others
outside of that event. See id.
166. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 995 (discussing lack of competition absent
NCAA rules).
167. See id. at 995-96 (“Like the conferences, these pairs may freely compete
against other pairs of schools whose games are scheduled for the same time in
order to secure a contract with whatever networks can show games during that
time slot.”).
168. See id. at 996-97 (concluding that plaintiffs have not showed harm to the
competition).  The Court did recognize that the plaintiffs showed harm to them-
selves because they do not receive compensation; however, the Court pointed out
that injury to the plaintiffs is not sufficient to show harm to the competition. See id.
at 997 (citing O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d 1464, 1469 (9th Cir.
1986).  The alleged injury must reach beyond the claimant and “reach a field of
commerce.” See id. at 994 (citing Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir.
1992)).
169. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 998 (comparing submarket for vide-
ogames to submarket for live game telecasts and noting that no harm to competi-
tion exists).
170. See id. (concluding that teams and conferences would complement each
other in this submarket as well).  The teams licensing intellectual property to vide-
ogame developers would not compete against other teams outside of the “set” re-
quired to produce a videogame because “the videogame developer determined
that those other teams’ group licenses were not required to produce the vide-
ogame.” See id.
171. See generally id. (determining lack of harm to competition in videogame
market).
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aging the licensing related to such footage.172  T3Media is “ex-
pressly prohibited from licensing any footage that features current
student-athletes” and must acquire licensing rights from former stu-
dent-athletes; therefore, current and former student-athletes are
deprived of nothing.173  The court determined that the current and
former student-athletes would not receive any more compensation
absent the rules than they would otherwise receive with rules in ef-
fect.174  Further, even if the plaintiffs proved a restraint, they could
not show harm to the competition because, like the other two sub-
markets, schools lack the incentive to compete.175
C. Procompetitive Justifications
After the court determined that the NCAA rules unlawfully re-
strained trade in the college education market, the burden shifted
to the NCAA to show procompetitive reasons for the restraint.176
The NCAA asserted the restraint on student-athlete compensation
promotes and maintains: (1) its history and dedication to amateur-
ism, (2) a competitive balance, (3) the integration of student-ath-
letes into the academic community, and (4) an increase in the
number of Division I basketball and FBS schools, student-athletes,
and games.177  After the NCAA proposed the procompetitive goals
of the restraint, the court found that limited restrictions on student-
athlete compensation may help schools achieve the goals of ama-
172. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 998 (discussing T3Media’s role in NCAA
licensing).  The court notes that T3Media cannot license footage featuring current
student-athletes and must obtain the rights to use former student-athletes’ NIL if
they appear in the footage it licenses. See id. Thus, “no current or former student-
athletes are actually deprived of any compensation for game re-broadcasts or other
archival footage that they would otherwise receive in the absence of the challenged
NCAA rules.” See id.
173. See id. (examining rights of T3Media).
174. See id. (discussing why there is lack of unlawful restraint in this sub-
market).  For a further discussion as to why the NCAA does not unlawfully restrain
the competition in this submarket, see supra note 172 and accompanying text. R
175. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 998-99 (concluding that if restraint ex-
isted, still, there is zero harm to competition).  Even if the plaintiffs showed unlaw-
ful restraint, “they have not presented sufficient evidence to show an injury to
competition in this submarket” because “T3Media would have to obtain a group
license from every team that has ever competed in FBS or Division I,” and those
teams have no reason to compete against each other. See id.
176. See id. at 999 (introducing NCAA’s procompetitive justifications and cit-
ing reason why NCAA must put forth procompetitive justifications).  For a further
discussion of the rule of reason analysis and balancing test, see sources cited supra
notes 102-106 and accompanying text. R
177. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (noting four procompetitive reasons
and introducing court’s consideration of each).
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teurism and integration.178  However, the court ruled that the
NCAA cannot rely on the asserted procompetitive goals of main-
taining a competitive balance and increased output as justifications
of the restraint.179
1. Amateurism
First, the NCAA asserted that the consumer demand for FBS
football and Division I basketball hinges on the NCAA’s preserva-
tion of amateurism.180  The NCAA argued its primary focus is, and
has always been, ensuring that student-athletes receive an educa-
tion.181  However, the court found contrasting evidence within the
language of the NCAA’s Bylaws as they were amended through the
years, and was not persuaded by this argument.182  The NCAA also
178. See id. at 1001, 1003 (concluding that limited restrictions may help
schools achieve procompetitive justifications of amateurism or student-athlete
integration).
179. See id. at 1002, 1004 (concluding that challenged restraint does not help
to achieve procompetitive justifications of maintaining competitive balance or in-
creased output).
180. See generally id. at 973-78 (discussing NCAA’s asserted justification that
current restrictions on student-athlete compensation serve NCAA’s longstanding
tradition of amateurism).  The NCAA presented and relied on “historical evi-
dence, consumer survey data, and lay witness testimony . . . .” See id. at 973.
181. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973-975 (examining history of NCAA’s
amateurism principle).  The court cites to the NCAA’s first bylaw governing ama-
teurism, which allowed “‘player subsidies’ and other illicit forms of payment.” See
id. at 974 (citations omitted).  The court cites to more amateurism policies from
the years 1916, 1922, 1948, and 1956, and discusses the changes in NCAA policy
related to amateurism during that time. See id.
182. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 974-75 (comparing initial amateurism
principle to current amateurism principle).  The Court notes the “stark contrast”
between the current amateurism policy and the initial policy. See id. at 975 (“In-
deed, education—which the NCAA now considers the primary motivation for par-
ticipating in intercollegiate athletics—was not even a recognized motivation for
amateur athletes during the years when the NCAA prohibited athletic scholar-
ships.”).  The court criticized the NCAA’s reliance on its “malleable” principle of
amateurism. See id. at 1000 (discussing ever-changing core principle of amateur-
ism).  The court provided examples to the inconsistencies:
The association’s current rules demonstrate that, even today, the NCAA
does not consistently adhere to a single definition of amateurism.  A Divi-
sion I tennis recruit can preserve his amateur status even if he accepts ten
thousand dollars in prize money the year before he enrolls in college.  A
Division I track and field recruit, however, would forfeit his athletic eligi-
bility if he did the same.  Similarly, an FBS football player may maintain
his amateur status if he accepts a Pell grant that brings his total financial
aid package above the cost of attendance.  But the same football player
would no longer be an amateur if he were to decline the Pell grant and,
instead, receive an equivalent sum of money from his school for the use
of his name, image, and likeness during live game telecasts.  Such incon-
sistencies are not indicative of “core principles.”
Id. (critiquing NCAA’s amateurism).
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argued that its amateurism principle increases the consumer de-
mand.183  However, the court concluded that the NCAA’s restric-
tions on compensation have not increased, or even significantly
contributed to, the popularity of Division I basketball or FBS foot-
ball—college sports fans are interested in college sports for other
reasons.184
In sum, the NCAA did not persuade the court that the preser-
vation of amateurism justifies the “rigid restrictions challenged in
this case.”185  However, the court did agree that limited restrictions
would allow the NCAA to achieve this procompetitive goal without
restraining competition in the market.186
2. Competitive Balance
Next, the NCAA asserted that the challenged restraints help to
maintain a competitive balance throughout Division I basketball
and FBS teams.187  The court disagreed, referencing sports econo-
mists’ conclusions that “the rules have no discernable effect on the
level of competitive balance.”188  Because schools do not pay more
than allowed, they spend the extra profit from athletics on coach-
183. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975 (introducing and examining NCAA’s
consumer survey on demand of college football in relation to commitment to ama-
teurism).  The Court pointed to inconsistent responses in the survey and irrele-
vance of many questions to the issue of O’Bannon. See id.  For example, an open-
ended question in the survey related to student-athletes receiving compensation,
which most commonly people thought to mean “receiving some form of illegal or
illicit payments.” See id. (internal citations omitted) (criticizing survey and its rela-
tion to issues in O’Bannon).  People also reported they would be less likely to watch
college sports if student-athletes were paid, but favored paying student-athletes. See
id. at 976.
184. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 977-78 (reasoning that college sports fans
enjoy watching college sports for other reasons, such as loyalty).
185. Id. at 1001 (concluding that NCAA’s restrictions are too strict to achieve
procompetitive justifications).
186. See id. at 100-01 (discussing consumer survey and what survey suggests).
Despite its inconsistencies, the relied upon survey did indicate “the public’s atti-
tudes toward student-athlete compensation depend heavily on the level of com-
pensation that student-athletes would receive.” See id.  Therefore, the court
concluded that the NCAA’s rules “may justify a restriction on large payments to
student-athletes while in school . . . .” See id. at 1001.
187. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 978-79 (discussing NCAA’s alleged
procompetitive justification in depth, including NCAA’s evidence from trial).
188. Id. at 978 (citations omitted) (referencing witnesses’ trial testimony).
The court continued by stating that the “consensus among sports economists who
have studied the issue . . .  is that the NCAA’s current restrictions on compensation
do not have any effect on competitive balance.” See id. at 1001.  One witness testi-
fied to an article which concluded that NCAA regulations, at best “appear to have
had a very limited effect, and at worst they have served to strengthen the position
of the dominant teams.’” See id. at 1002 (citations omitted) (quoting article writ-
ten by Katie Baird on competitive balance in sports).
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ing, recruiting, and training facilities in, what witnesses referred to
as, an “arms race.”189  Therefore, high budgets in other areas elimi-
nate any “leveling effect” of restrictions on student-athlete compen-
sation.190  Those high revenue schools continuously profit from the
NCAA March Madness Tournament and FBS Bowl Games leaving
mid-majors and other less competitive conferences to suffer, which
“hinders . . . competitive balance.”191  In sum, the court concluded
that the NCAA’s rules are not necessary to maintain a competitive
balance.192
3. Integration of Academics and Athletics
The NCAA asserted that the restrictions on student-athlete
compensation promote the integration of student-athletes into the
general student body, so paying student-athletes “would potentially
‘create a wedge’ between student-athletes and others on campus,”
including professors.193  Specifically, the NCAA argued that the in-
tegration of student-athletes into the general academic community
benefits the student-athletes because they retain access to programs
that foster academic growth.194  The court stated that the educa-
189. See id. at 1002 (stating that college sports’ revenues have grown since
1980s, which gives college athletic programs ability to spend more money on other
areas to improve program and appeal to recruits).
190. See id. (noting that changes in revenue that have changed NCAA mem-
ber schools’ budgeting do not keep competitive balance among schools).
191. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 979 (discussing NCAA’s “unequal” reve-
nue distribution formula).  The court stated that the NCAA’s revenue distribution
formula “rewards the schools and conferences that already have the largest athletic
budgets” because the revenues are distributed depending on how conferences’
member schools have performed in the NCAA tournament in the past six years.
See id. (discussing revenue distribution formula). See also NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATH-
LETIC ASS’N, 2013-14 Division I Revenue Distribution Plan, NCAA, https://www
.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2013-14%20Revenue%20Distribution%20Plan.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015) [hereinafter “Revenue Distribution”] (charting and dis-
cussing different areas where NCAA Division I revenue goes and why). See also
Chris Smith, March Madness: A Trip to the Final Four is Worth $9.5 Million, FORBES
(March 14, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03/14/march-
madness-a-trip-to-the-final-four-is-worth-9-5-million/ (discussing value of NCAA
March Madness Tournament).
192. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1002 (concluding that NCAA cannot rely
on “competitive balance” as procompetitive justification of student-athlete com-
pensation restrictions).
193. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980 (discussing NCAA’s evidence to sup-
port integration of student-athletes as procompetitive justification of restraints on
compensation).  University administrators testified at trial that, depending on how
much money student-athletes received, a gap could form in which student-athletes
separate themselves from the academic campus. See id.
194. See id. at 979-80 (discussing beneficial academic and educational support
programs available to NCAA student-athletes).  An expert witness for the NCAA
testified that student-athletes benefit from a “better academic and labor market . . .
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tional services are unrelated to the restrictions on compensation,
and schools “offer most of these services to their student-athletes
independently, uncompelled to do so by the NCAA, especially not
by the challenged rules.”195
However, the court found that much of the benefits result
from the NCAA’s prohibition on allowing all-athlete dorms, its pro-
hibition on allowing student-athletes to practice more than a cer-
tain number of hours per week, and because the NCAA rules
require student-athletes to attend class and meet certain grade
point average requirements for athletic eligibility.196  In considera-
tion of the NCAA’s arguments, the court concluded that, NCAA
schools cannot create a blanket prohibition on student-compensa-
tion in the future, but limited restrictions would help the schools
prevent a wedge between student-athletes and non-student-
athletes.197
4. Increased Output
Last, the NCAA asserted that the rules restricting student-ath-
lete compensation increase the number of FBS and Division I bas-
ketball schools, which increases opportunities to play for these
intercollegiate athletic programs, otherwise known as “increased
as compared to other members of their socioeconomic groups.” See id. (citations
omitted).  However, the court added that the mere participation in intercollegiate
athletics with the challenged rules in place does not lead to the beneficial out-
comes for students. See id. at 980.  A “better academic and labor market” for a
student-athlete from a disadvantaged background stems from “increased access to
financial aid, tutoring, academic support, mentorship, structured schedules, and
other educational services that are unrelated to the challenged rules in this case.”
See id.
195. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980 (emphasis added) (disputing NCAA’s
argument that challenged rules lead to academic and educational benefits for stu-
dent-athletes).  For a further discussion of the programs and the Court’s disagree-
ment with the NCAA’s purported justification, see supra note 194 and R
accompanying text.
196. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 980 (remarking on NCAA rules that better
foster student-athlete integration).  The rules that “mostly” help the student-ath-
letes to interact with faculty and non-student-athletes are not challenged in this
case. See id.
197. See id. at 1003 (“[T]he only way in which the challenged rules might
facilitate the ‘integration of academics and athletics is by preventing student-ath-
letes from being cut off from the broader campus community.  Limited restrictions
on student-athlete compensation may help schools achieve this narrow procompe-
titive goal.”).  The court compared this procompetitive justification to the NCAA’s
asserted amateurism justification, stating that “the NCAA may not use this goal to
justify its sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation, paid now or
in the future, from licensing revenue generated from the use of student-athletes’
names, images, and likenesses.” See id.
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output.”198  The court disagreed with the NCAA’s argument that
the challenged restraints attract schools with a commitment to ama-
teurism.199  The court also did not find that the restrictions on stu-
dent-athlete compensation enable other low-budget schools to
participate in Division I athletics.200  Ultimately, the court ruled
that the NCAA restrictions on student-athlete compensation do not
result in an increased output, and, subsequently, schools would not
leave these divisions if the rules changed.201
D. Alternatives
Because the NCAA presented enough evidence showing lim-
ited restrictions may achieve two procompetitive effects, the bur-
den-shifted to the plaintiffs to prove that the procompetitive effects
could be achieved effectively through a less restrictive, financially
feasible manner.202  The plaintiffs presented three less restrictive
198. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 981-82 (discussing NCAA’s argu-
ment that challenged rules help to increase output of Division I basketball and FBS
schools).
199. See id. at 1004 (noting NCAA’s argument: restrictions on compensation
increase number of schools that participate in Division I sports because schools
want to join NCAA Division I athletics for its commitment to amateurism).  The
court refuted this claim with trial exhibits that showed major conference repre-
sentatives requesting to change the grant-in-aid rules, which shows that the schools
are not drawn to Division I for its commitment to amateurism. See id. at 981, 1004
(discussing fact that schools wanted to change rules).  Further, the NCAA’s ama-
teurism policy is the same at all levels, not just Division I. See id. at 981.  Schools’
hope for joining Division I likely stems from increased revenue and exposure. See
id. at 981-82.
200. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1004 (concluding that NCAA’s argument
that rules enable schools to participate in Division I is “unsupported”).  “Neither
the NCAA nor its member conferences require high-revenue schools to subsidize
the FBS football or Division I basketball teams at lower-revenue schools.” Id.  Plain-
tiffs were not “seeking an injunction requiring schools to provide compensation to
their student-athletes–they are seeking an injunction to permit schools to do so.”
See id.
201. See id. at 982 (refuting NCAA’s argument).  Further, there is no reason to
believe that “athletic programs would be driven to financial ruin” if Division I
schools could pay student-athletes. See id. at 1004.
202. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1004-05 (discussing plaintiffs’ next steps
and reasons for burden-shift).  The court pointed to the NCAA’s evidence “sug-
gesting that preventing schools from paying FBS football and Division I basketball
players large sums of money wile they are enrolled in school may serve to increase
consumer demand for its product” and the evidence that “this restriction may facil-
itate its member schools’ efforts to integrate student-athletes into the academic
communities on their campuses . . . .” See id. at 1004.  Because the NCAA showed
some justifications for the restrictions, “the burden shift[ed] back to Plaintiffs to
show that these procompetitive goals can be achieved in ‘other and better
ways’. . . .” See id. (quoting Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 n.4
(9th Cir. 1991)).  The court continued that the proposed alternatives must not
have a significant increase on the costs. See id. at 1005 (citations omitted).
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alternatives: (1) providing student-athletes with stipends; (2) hold-
ing in trust limited and equal shares of NIL license revenue; and
(3) permitting student-athletes to receive limited compensation for
school-approved third-party endorsements.203  The court found two
of the three proposed alternatives legitimate: stipends and trusts.204
First, the court found that stipends not exceeding the cost of
attendance would “limit the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s
current restraint without impeding the NCAA’s efforts” to achieve
amateurism and athletic-academic integration.205  A limited stipend
would not interfere with the consumer demand for amateur athlet-
ics, nor would it hinder student-athlete integration into the general
student body.206
Second, the court found that deferred payments held in a trust
for student-athletes and equally distributed to the athletes upon ex-
piration of NCAA eligibility would not affect amateurism or integra-
tion.207  The NCAA may limit the payments and require the money
come from NIL licenses in order to ensure its procompetitive goals
are achieved.208  The court concluded that the stipends and de-
203. See id. at 982 (outlining plaintiffs’ proposed less restrictive alternatives to
restraint).
204. See id. at 1005 (identifying two proposed alternatives as “legitimate”).
205. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982-83 (explaining plaintiffs’ proposed
stipends).  The stipends “would only cover educational expenses” because they
would be “capped at the cost of attendance.”  See id. at 983.  The Court remarked
that the NCAA used to provide similar stipends, and NCAA President Mark Em-
mert testified that covering the full cost of attendance “would not violate the
NCAA’s amateurism rules.” See id. (internal citations omitted) (referring to depo-
sition and testimony).
206. See id. (elaborating on why proposed alternative is legitimate and would
not decrease consumer demand or hinder student-athlete integration).  In fact,
the court believes that allowing stipends “would facilitate [student-athletes’] inte-
gration into academic life by removing some of the educational expenses that they
would otherwise have to bear, such as school supplies, which are not covered by
full grant-in-aid.” See id.
207. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983 (discussing how plaintiffs’ proposition
to hold money in trust for student-athletes would enable NCAA to achieve goals in
less restrictive manner).  The Court claimed that holding money in a trust would
not affect the popularity of college sports, nor would it “erect any new barriers to
schools’ efforts to educate student-athletes or integrate them into their schools
academic communities.” See id. at 984.
208. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983-84, 1005-05 (discussing feasibility of
stipends and payments in trust).  The court concluded that if the stipends did not
exceed the cost of attendance and the payments in trust did not exceed five thou-
sand dollars, the NCAA could still achieve its procompetitive goals. See id. at 982-
984.  Specifically, in response to the plaintiffs’ trust proposition, the NCAA wit-
nesses were concerned that student-athletes may attempt to monetize the trust
while still enrolled in school or borrow against the trust, to which the court stated
that nothing suggests the NCAA’s current rules “would not suffice to prevent stu-
dent-athletes from borrowing against their future compensation,” nor does any-
37
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ferred payments would actually increase the price competition in
the relevant markets and leave the NCAA’s goals unharmed.209
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ third proposition, which
would allow student-athletes to receive money from endorsement
contracts because the NCAA would not be able to protect student-
athletes from commercial exploitation if student-athletes could
commercially endorse products.210  The court believed the NCAA’s
purposes of amateurism and student-athlete integration would suf-
fer if student-athletes were to receive money from endorsements.211
Also, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not necessarily wish to
enjoin the NCAA from enforcing its rules prohibiting
endorsements.212
E. The Court’s Game Plan
The O’Bannon court concluded that the NCAA’s challenged
rules unreasonably restrain trade.213 The court issued an injunction
against the NCAA to begin at the start of the next FBS football and
Division I basketball recruiting cycles, which must not be stayed
pending appeal.214  The injunction prevents the NCAA from
prohibiting its member schools and conferences from offering re-
cruits a share of licensing revenue from student-athletes’ NIL
through stipends and holding money in a trust.215  However, the
NCAA may cap the amount of revenue offered to the student-ath-
letes at $5,000, but no less than the cost-of-attendance.216
The injunction does not prevent the NCAA from enforcing ex-
isting rules or enacting new rules that would prohibit student-ath-
thing prevent the NCAA from “plac[ing] the money in a special account, such as a
spendthrift trust, to prevent such borrowing.” See id. at 984.
209. For a further discussion of the Court’s acceptance of the plaintiffs’ pro-
posed alternatives, see supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text. R
210. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 984 (ruling that allowing student-athletes
to commercially endorse products is not less restrictive way to achieve NCAA’s
goals).
211. See id. (stating endorsement proposal “does not offer a less restrictive way
for the NCAA to achieve its purposes.”).
212. See id. (giving reason for denying third proposed alternative).
213. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (concluding that the NCAA’s chal-
lenged rules unreasonably restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act).
214. See id. at 1007-08 (discussing injunction in general).
215. See id. at 1008 (explaining injunction in depth).
216. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008 (noting limitations NCAA and mem-
ber schools may place on stipends and trust accounts).  The court reasoned as to
why the schools can cap the trust at $5,000.  See id.  Further, the court ruled that
the schools may not “unlawfully conspire with each other in setting the amounts.”
See id.
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letes from using the money held in trust while the student-athletes
are in school.217  Nor does the injunction prevent schools from en-
acting a rule that would prohibit a school from offering one recruit
more than another.218  Additionally, the NCAA still may limit the
amount of football and basketball scholarships.219  Further, the in-
junction does not preclude the NCAA from enforcing its current
rules on endorsements, academic eligibility, athlete-only dorms,
limited practice hours, or any other rule that achieves the NCAA’s
procompetitive goals.220
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
With the O’Bannon decision, the court blazes a new trail in a
familiar forest.  The court’s antitrust analysis played out as ex-
pected, however, the decision to allow college athletes to receive
compensation is unprecedented.221  In past decisions, the NCAA
has been subject to, and found in violation of antitrust law.222  More
commonly, however, courts find for the NCAA.223  It is also com-
mon for the NCAA to settle lawsuits and avoid a judgment that
would potentially disrupt its framework.224
217. See id. (explaining injunction).
218. See id. (explaining injunction).
219. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008 (explaining injunction).
220. See id. (explaining injunction).
221. For a discussion of past decision, see infra notes 222-224 and accompany- R
ing text.
222. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (holding that NCAA’s television plan was cartel and
unreasonably restrained trade); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d
1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court’s order granting permanent
injunction prohibiting NCAA from placing compensation limits on certain Divi-
sion I entry-level coaching jobs).
223. See, e.g., Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir.
2012) (dismissing student-athletes’ claims that NCAA regulations capping scholar-
ship numbers violates Sherman Act); Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139
F.3d 180, 186 (3rd Cir. 1998) (finding that Sherman Act does not apply to NCAA’s
eligibility requirements and affirming grant of motion to dismiss student-athlete’s
claims for failure to state claim); Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746
F.Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (determining that NCAA’s eligibility rules are
procompetitive and reasonable under Sherman Act); McCormack v. Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing student-athletes’
claim that NCAA’s restrictions on compensation constitutes illegal price-fixing in
violation of Sherman Act). See also Tohanczyn, supra note 39, at 411 (discussing R
various dismissals of antitrust claims against NCAA by both Supreme Court and
circuit courts).
224. See WONG, supra note 3, at 509-10 (discussing White v. National Collegiate R
Athletic Association, in which student-athletes and NCAA settled over claims that
NCAA’s financial aid cap violated Sherman Act).  In White, the NCAA agreed to
pay the student-athletes an additional $10 million and reimburse them for educa-
tional expenses. See id. at 510 (discussing White v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
39
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In O’Bannon, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the
NCAA restricts competition to a certain extent, and accepted two of
the three proposed less restrictive alternatives—allowing stipends
and holding money in trust—but rejected the endorsement propo-
sal.225  The court feared that allowing student-athletes to receive
compensation for endorsements would expose them to commercial
exploitation.226  Indeed, evidence presented to the court indicated
that the NCAA has not always done its job in protecting student-
athletes from exploitation; however, the court was not convinced
that the NCAA would not be able to provide such protection in the
future.227
Ironically, the O’Bannon case revolves around plaintiffs’ claim
that the NCAA commercially exploits student-athletes.  One of the
O’Bannon plaintiffs, Harry Flourony, stated the following: “[The
case is] about human rights.  There is an entire class of people—
college athletes—who are being exploited by a powerful few.
Someone had to take a stand, and [O’Bannon] had the courage
and commitment to do so.”228  O’Bannon and the other plaintiffs
CV06-0999 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008)).  The NCAA settles many non-antitrust law-
suits, as well. See Oliver v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 920 N.E.2d 203, 206-08
(Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (describing case background).  In Oliver, the plaintiff
brought an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the NCAA be-
cause he wanted to prevent the NCAA from enforcing NCAA eligibility bylaws
against him. See id. at 206-09. See also Alan C. Milstein, Court Blows Fastball Down
NCAA Pipe, SPORTS LAW BLOG (Feb. 12, 2009), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/
2009/02/court-blows-fastball-down-ncaa-pipe.html (discussing basis of Oliver’s ar-
gument and NCAA’s hypocrisy).
225. For a further discussion of the court’s decision, see supra notes 203-211 R
and accompanying text. But see Corgan, supra note 39, at 415 (arguing that provid- R
ing student-athletes with stipends will not fix problem).  “The risk/reward relation-
ship currently weighs in favor of accepting benefits from sports agents because
these student-athletes have no other source of income.” Id. at 418.
226. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 984 (rejecting plaintiffs’ third proposed
less restrictive alternative).  According to the Court, allowing student-athletes to
receive compensation from endorsement deals would “undermine the efforts of
the NCAA and its member schools” to protect student-athletes against commercial
exploitation. See id.  But see Corgan, supra note 39, at 415 (“By permitting student- R
athletes to seek and accept endorsement deals, the NCAA would essentially elimi-
nate the need for student-athletes to improperly accept money from sports
agents.”).
227. See id. (trusting NCAA will work to ensure student-athletes are protected
from commercial exploitation in future). For a further discussion concerning inci-
dents of commercial exploitation in the NCAA, see supra notes 76-88 and accompa- R
nying text.
228. See Shipnuck, supra note 8, at 56 (emphasis added) (discussing support R
O’Bannon has received from his dedication to this lawsuit). O’Bannon told
Shipnuck that the suit “is about acknowledging that it’s the athletes who make
college sports such a big business.  They don’t need to be given a ton of money,
but how about a nice stipend so they can buy some new clothes or take their girl to
a decent restaurant?” See id.
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were taking a stand against the NCAA’s exploitation of student-ath-
letes.229  But, the NCAA argued that allowing student-athletes to
personally receive money for the use of their NIL through endorse-
ment contracts would leave the student-athletes open to commer-
cial exploitation—and the court agreed.230  The court does not
address this irony in its opinion.231
The NCAA makes a significant amount of money from televi-
sion contracts, ticket sales, and merchandise sales, which all involve
the need for student-athletes’ NIL.232  College athletics would not,
and could not, exist without the student-athletes who bring excite-
ment and a sense of school pride to the programs.233  The NCAA
reaps monetary gains, but the student-athletes do not.  If student-
athletes were permitted to land endorsement contracts, the stu-
dent-athletes would have the chance to keep the money earned
from the use of their NIL.234
VII. IMPACT
“You’re telling me it’s because the numbers didn’t look right?
Because the numbers didn’t look right? And you’ll go home and
sleep in a comfortable, big-ass house.  But it’s OK. . . . Some of
these cats came from 3,000 miles away to play here, to be a
part of this. To be a part of all of this.
But you say ‘numbers’? ”235
229. See Shipnuck, supra note 8, at 54-56 (exposing O’Bannon’s reasons for R
following through with lawsuit).  O’Bannon claimed the following: “Reform is
coming.  I think public opinion has changed dramatically. The NCAA is going to
have to change too.  Their rules are so outdated, they can’t get away with it for-
ever.” See id. at 54.
230. For a further discussion, see supra notes 210-211 and accompanying text. R
231. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955.
232. For a further discussion into the NCAA’s annual revenue and sources of
revenue, see supra notes 2-3, 39 and each note’s accompanying text. R
233. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 977-78 (citing to testimony of three wit-
nesses discussing reasons for consumer demand of NCAA Division I basketball and
FBS football, noting loyalty to alma maters and schools in fans’ geographical
regions).
234. See Corgan, supra note 39, at 415 (arguing that allowing student-athletes R
to accept endorsement deals would eliminate many problems with NCAA’s com-
pensation rules).  Corgan argues that paying student-athletes “thirty to fifty dollars
per month (or $360 to $600 a year) would not lessen the desire for poor student-
athletes to accept thousands of dollars from sports agents.” See id.  Extra-collegiate
boosters and agents involvement in NCAA athletics consistently tends to plague
the NCAA’s amateurism system and causes commercial exploitation of student-
athletes, which the NCAA seeks, and is seeking, to avoid. See supra note 76-88, 210- R
212, and accompanying text. R
235. Braylon Rumph, UAB Football Players in Disgust #FREEUAB, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAvSuQEh6lI&app=desktop
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Should the court’s decision in O’Bannon withstand the NCAA’s
appeal, the impact of this decision will reach far into the future of
college athletics.  The court’s decision will significantly impact col-
lege basketball, women’s and lower-revenue sports, and the struc-
ture of the NCAA as an organization.  If the court allowed for
student-athletes to receive money from licensing their own NIL,
they would be paid by the third-party companies, such as Nike or
Adidas, and the following issues may not be as imminent.
A. NCAA Structure
The spillover effect from the court’s decision in O’Bannon has
potential to change the entire structure of the NCAA.  Ed
O’Bannon and his team of plaintiffs fought this case to trial, which
many other plaintiffs did not do.236  With their victory, albeit cur-
rently in the appellate process,237 the plaintiffs are giving hope to
those involved in other lawsuits against the NCAA.238
The court’s order cannot be stayed pending appeal.239  Thus, if
the appellate process is not complete prior to the next recruiting
(documenting Tristan Henderson’s, a University of Alabama at Birmingham foot-
ball player, emotional reaction to University shutting down its football program).
236. For a further discussion, see supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text. R
237. See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Files Reply in O’Bannon Appeal, USA TODAY
(Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/
2015/02/11/ncaa-ed-obannon-appeal-1984-supreme-court-ruling/23267753/ (dis-
cussing history of NCAA’s appeal and current state of appeal).
238. Other recent lawsuits involve student-athletes and those on their behalf
fighting against the NCAA’s traditional structure.  For example, lawyer Jeffrey Kess-
ler filed a suit against the NCAA seeking an open market instead of the restrictions
on compensation also fought in O’Bannon. See Steve Eder, How Kessler’s Lawsuit
Could Change College Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/28/sports/how-jeffrey-kesslers-lawsuit-could-change-college-sports
.html?_r=0 (transcribing conversation with Kessler regarding lawsuit).  He envi-
sions an open market where the price is not fixed at scholarship money, or even
$5,000 over the scholarship amount. See id.  Additionally, in March 2014, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board Regional Chicago Office held that the Northwestern
University football players were employees under the National Labor Relations
Act. See generally, e.g., Jon Solomon, NCAA and Others File Briefs in Northwestern Foot-
ball Union Effort, CBS SPORTS (July 3, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/col-
legefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24606865/ncaa-and-others-file-briefs-in-
northwestern-football-union-effort (discussing Northwestern lawsuit and NCAA’s
brief in support of University’s efforts to combat unionization ruling); Patrick Vint,
Explaining What the Northwestern College Football Union Decision Means, SB NATION
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/3/27/
5551014/college-football-players-union-northwestern-nlrb (explaining NLRB’s rul-
ing that student-athletes can unionize).
239. For a further discussion of the court’s ruling in O’Bannon, see supra note
214 and accompanying text. R
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cycle, eligible schools will likely promise top recruits money.240
Should schools choose to pay student-athletes, the schools might
not be able to use the money made from Division I basketball and
FBS football to fund other aspects of the university.241  Paying stu-
dent-athletes will likely lead to less money made from the athletics
department finding its way into a university’s general budget,
coaches’ salaries, athletic facilities, or other amenities.242
If the court’s decision is overturned after a recruiting class has
been promised money, and members of that recruiting class have
signed National Letters of Intent,243 the NCAA member schools
should allow those student-athlete recruits to be released from the
contract, if they chose a school because of the monetary incentive,
much like when a coach leaves a school after student-athletes have
signed National Letters of Intent.244
In respect to future antitrust lawsuits, in O’Bannon, the NCAA
posed four procompetitive defenses, of which the court accepted
240. For a further discussion of the court’s ruling in O’Bannon, see supra notes
213-220 and accompanying text. R
241. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1002
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (“revenues from FBS football and Division I basketball have
grown exponentially since Board of Regents was decided and that, as a result of this
growth, many schools have invested more heavily in their recruiting efforts, ath-
letic facilities, dorms, coaching, and other amenities designed to attract the top
student-athletes.”).  For a further discussion of how schools spend money made
from athletics, see supra notes 55-56, 73, 80-81, and 88 and their accompanying R
texts.
242. For a further discussion of money made from athletics, see supra notes
55-56, 73, 80-81, and 88 and their accompanying texts. R
243. See generally OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 13 (noting NCAA R
recruiting rules).  Student-athletes sign National Letters of Intent in order to be
given written scholarship offers to play at a NCAA member school. See OPERATING
BYLAWS, supra note 4, art. 13.9.1. R
244. Because the National Letter of Intent is a contract between the prospec-
tive student-athlete and the NCAA member school, the prospective student-athlete
cannot simply break the contract because the coach who recruited him left the
school before the student-athlete began his enrollment at the NCAA member
school. See NCAA, The National Letter of Intent, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/media-center/national-letter-intent  (last visited Dec. 1, 2014)
(answering frequently asked questions regarding National Letters of Intent). See
also National Letter of Intent, NLI Provisions: Coaching Changes, NATIONAL LETTER,
http://www.nationalletter.org/nliProvisions/coachingChange.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2014) (“I understand I have signed this NLI with the institution and not for
a particular sport or coach. If a coach leaves the institution or the sports program
(e.g., not retained, resigns), I remain bound by the provisions of this NLI.”).  How-
ever, the student-athlete can request a release, which the school can choose to
grant. See NCAA, supra this note (“The release process consists of a prospective
student-athlete submitting a release request to his or her school.  If the school
declines the release, the prospective student-athlete may appeal to an NLI review
committee.”).
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two.245  Therefore, with O’Bannon as precedent, and assuming the
decision is upheld on appeal, the NCAA will likely be unable to rely
on all four procompetitive effects in future lawsuits, depending on
the claims alleged against the NCAA.
B. Budgeting and Basketball
O’Bannon will have a large impact on Division I college basket-
ball.  The NCAA March Madness Tournament produces significant
revenue for the NCAA.246  The NCAA has a “Basketball Fund” that
is distributed to Division I conferences based on a conference’s
NCAA March Madness Tournament performance over six years.247
Each game is worth a monetary amount, which has increased at a
steady rate since 2009, and it is estimated that one single game
played in the 2017 Tournament will be worth $1.9 million.248  This
revenue distribution structure benefits mid-major schools and Cin-
derella teams who seem to have smaller programs and come from
less-dominant conferences.249  Schools put a large amount of
money into their basketball programs, hoping to score a generous
payout from the NCAA Tournament.250
However, after O’Bannon, mid-major schools and other schools
with historically smaller football programs may slowly become mem-
ories in the NCAA Basketball Tournament.251  With the introduc-
245. For a further discussion of the NCAA’s proposed procompetitive justifi-
cations and the court’s decision to accept two, see supra notes 177-201 and accom- R
panying text.
246. See WONG, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing profitability of NCAA Men’s
March Madness Tournament).
247. See Revenue Distribution, supra note 191, at 7-9 (discussing “Basketball R
Fund”).  “In 2014, each basketball unit will be approximately $250,100 for a total
$193.58 million distribution.” See id. at 7.
248. See Smith, supra note 191 (discussing steady increase in worth of NCAA R
Basketball Tournament).  At the rate the monetary amount of a single game in the
NCAA Tournament is increasing, “a team in the Final Four, after having played in
five Tournament games, will make approximately $9.5 million.” See id.
249. See Smith, supra note 191 (discussing “immense value” of Tournament). R
The Tournament benefits smaller schools “that manage multiple underdog victo-
ries.” See id.  For example, “VCU spent just $2.8 million on basketball last year, but
the Rams’ Final Four run will earn the Colonial Athletic Association about $8.75
million over the next few years.” See id. See also Revenue Distribution, supra note
191, at 9 (listing distribution of basketball fund to different conferences). R
250. See Smith, supra note 191 (arguing that because Tournament is so suc- R
cessful, schools put large amounts of money into their basketball programs).
251. See generally Alexander Wolff, Members Only: By 2039, the NCAA Tourna-
ment Will Look Very Different, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.si
.com/college-basketball/2014/08/18/ncaa-tournament-future (posing hypotheti-
cal future of college basketball where five powerful conferences ran other confer-
ences out of relevance because five conferences could afford to pay student-
athletes and others could not).  Writing from the anticipated year 2039, Wolff
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tion of stipends and trusts, schools with historically smaller football
programs will unlikely be able to keep up with schools that also
profit from football.252  Competition for top football recruits will
begin to have a monetary aspect, because schools may begin prom-
ising recruits stipends or trust payments, until the appeals court de-
termines otherwise.253  This competition will likely cause a ripple
effect, and schools with bigger budgets from football will be able to
offer basketball recruits money, thus, will be able to maintain a
competitive basketball program and continue post-season play.
However, schools that make money solely from basketball will slowly
lose competitiveness as bigger schools begin dominating the
recruiting field in the rich-get-richer fashion.
C. Women’s and Lower Revenue Sports
Because the O’Bannon decision only affects Division I men’s
basketball players and FBS football players, it will impact other
sports, including women’s sports.  The demands of maintaining a
Division I program are high.254  Schools with lower budgets allotted
to sports may have to cut programs that do not produce revenue to
maintain sports teams.255
states, “former mid-major powers as Butler, Gonzaga and VCU, with no football
revenue or windfall from massive TV contracts, lapsed into mediocrity.” See id.  He
writes that schools like Villanova and Georgetown, who do not have a football tele-
vision deal (both play in FCS), could no longer “afford to take a priest for the
bench on road trips and both fell into irrelevancy.” See id.  He predicts that by
2031 most of the “lesser leagues” will flee to Division II or Division III. See id.
252. See Wolff, supra note 251 (discussing eventual decline of athletic pro- R
grams at schools with historically smaller football programs).  For a further discus-
sion of Wolff’s article, see supra note 251. R
253. For a further discussion of the court’s decision in O’Bannon, see supra
notes 205-209, 215-216, and accompanying text. R
254. See KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, COLLEGE
SPORTS KNIGHT COMMISSION 101, 9-12 (2009), available at http://www.knightcom-
mission.org/collegesports101/table-of-contents (discussing expenses of Division I
athletics, particularly FBS football).  In its chapter titled “Expenses,” the Knight
Commission discusses why maintaining an FBS football program costs so much.
See id.
255. See, e.g., UAB Shutting Down Football Program, ESPN (Dec. 3, 2014), http://
espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/11967626/uab-blazers-shut-football-pro-
gram (discussing University of Alabama at Birmingham’s reason for cutting foot-
ball program); Jeff Blumenthal, Experts: Temple Cut Sports Because Football Not
Producing Enough Revenue, PHILADELPHIA BUSINESS JOURNAL (Dec. 10, 2013), http://
www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2013/12/10/experts-temple-cut-sports-
because.html?page=all (discussing Temple University’s decision to cut seven varsity
sports to save approximately $3 million).
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Additionally, this decision may affect Title IX compliance at
the schools.256  Title IX, enacted in 1972, requires gender equality
in educational programs, including sports scholarships and oppor-
tunities.257  Because O’Bannon permits schools to offer male basket-
ball and football recruits money,258 a potential for inequality to
women exists, because under Title IX, no person shall suffer dis-
crimination on the basis of gender under any education program
or activity that receives Federal financial assistance.259  Athletic
scholarships are part of a school’s financial aid, falling under Title
IX regulations; therefore, men cannot receive more benefits or op-
portunities than women in the realm of intercollegiate athletics.260
Under a trust program, male athletes will receive the trust
money upon surrendering their eligibility, which might be a prob-
lem because the schools will have enticed the student-athletes to
come to the school for the money and will have saved the money
for them, providing them with a greater benefit than the female
student-athletes.261  The stipends, however, may pose a larger issue
because the money will cover the cost of attendance and will be
256. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88
(1972).
257. See id. (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”). See also Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608,
615 (noting that Title IX prohibits gender inequity in athletics).
258. For a further discussion of the court’s decision in O’Bannon, see supra
notes 205-209, 215-216, and accompanying text.  Note that O’Bannon concerned R
male student-athletes who play Division I basketball and FBS football. See
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 965 (describing plaintiffs in case).
259. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (prohibiting sex discrimination). But see Marc
Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association: A Small Step Forward For College-Athlete Rights, And A Gateway For Far
Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2355-58 (arguing that Title IX claim
may fail under certain court decision in Stanley v. University of Southern California
(citing Stanley v. S. Cal. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994))). Stanley is a Ninth Circuit
case in which the court rejected a motion to enjoin USC from paying its men’s
basketball coach more than its women’s basketball coach. See Stanley, 13 F.3d at
1316 (summarizing case). See also Edelman, supra this note, at 2358 (discussing
facts of Stanley and its relation to Title IX and O’Bannon).
260. See Haffner v. Temple Univ. of the Com. System of Higher Educ., 678
F.Supp. 517, 538 (E.D.Pa. 1987) (“[A]thletic scholarships are a part of the Univer-
sity’s financial aid program, and are within the ambit of Title IX.”).
261. See Michael McCann, What Ed O’Bannon’s Victory Over the NCAA Means
Moving Forward, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 9, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-
basketball/2014/08/09/ed-obannon-ncaa-claudia-wilken-appeal-name-image-like-
ness-rights (arguing that O’Bannon outcome “will not necessarily lead colleges to
violate Title IX” because student-athletes will not receive payment until expiration
of eligibility, but might because funds “accrued while they were in school.”).
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immediately realized for the male student-athletes.262  Schools must
plan accordingly.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The O’Bannon decision will have a positive effect on the future
for NCAA Division I men’s basketball and FBS football players.  The
decision has the potential to change the entire landscape of the
NCAA.  Because the court ruled in favor of allowing for stipends
and trusts, colleges and universities will have to reevaluate their
recruiting processes, adhering strictly to their financial limitations
and compliance policies, should O’Bannon withstand appeals.
Meghan Rose Price*
262. See id. (stating that trusts may not be issue for Title IX purposes).  How-
ever, schools are allowed to provide stipends to the eligible student-athletes, which
may pose a problem for Title IX compliance. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., Villa-
nova University, 2011.  I dedicate this Castenote to my grandfather.  Thank you for
encouraging me to research and learn about as much as I can.  Thank you to my
parents, family, friends, and angels in Heaven for your unconditional and eternal
support.  Joey, thank you for showing me what it means to be a hardworking stu-
dent-athlete.  Colleen, thank you for being my biggest fan.  God Bless America.
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